Industrial Merger and Public Policy, Issue 50 |
Contents
PREFACE | 7 |
POSSIBLE JUSTIFICATIONS FOR OFFICIAL | 15 |
III | 22 |
Copyright | |
3 other sections not shown
Common terms and phrases
acquired firm acquisitions action Anthony Crosland appeals agency argument ARNOLD PLANT ARTHUR SELDON Britain British business decisions buys CALIFORNIA/SANTA CRUZ UNIVERSITY capital chalk firm cheese firm competition conflict conglomerate merger constraints corporate control CRUZ The University decision-making discussion Dr Hindley's economies of scale effective efficient example government policy GRAHAM HUTTON HAMISH GRAY Harvard Law Review Hobart Papers horizontal merger incentive increase incumbent managers industrial logic insofar INSTITUTE OF ECONOMIC interests of owners judgement largest firm loss manufacturer marginal cost market in corporate maximise returns ment merge merger policy Monopolies Commission monopolistic monopoly power official bodies official intervention operation output owner-controlled owners of firms ownership possible potential purchasers problem production Professor profits proxy fight public interest public policy RALPH HARRIS Rank-De La Rue reduce require retailer Rue merger shareholders shares social take-over trust-busting University Library UNIVERSITY UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA/SANTA vertical integration vertical merger
References to this book
Intervention in the Mixed Economy: The Evolution of British Industrial ... Stephen C. Young,A. V. Lowe No preview available - 1974 |