Lying, Misleading, and What is Said: An Exploration in Philosophy of Language and in Ethics
Many people (both philosophers and not) find it very natural to think that deceiving someone in a way that avoids lying—by merely misleading—is morally preferable to simply lying. Others think that this preference is deeply misguided. But all sides agree that there is a distinction. In Lying, Misleading, and What is Said, Jennifer Saul undertakes a close examination of the lying/misleading distinction. Saul begins by using this very intuitive distinction to shed new light on entrenched debates in philosophy of language over notions like what is said. Next, she tackles the puzzling but widespread moral preference for misleading over lying, and arrives at a new view regarding the moral significance of the distinction. Finally, Saul draws her conclusions together to examine a range of historically important and interesting cases, from a consideration of modern politicians to the early Jesuits.
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Lying, Misleading, and What Is Said: An Exploration in Philosophy of ...
Jennifer Mather Saul
No preview available - 2015
argue audience Austere avoid lying Bach Bach’s Billy Cappelen and Lepore’s Chapter claim clearly Clinton Clinton’s utterance Completion conception of saying consider Constrained conceptions contextual supplementation conversational implicature Dave Dave’s deception definition of lying discussed distinction between lying Egyptian Arabic Empire State Building example false belief Fred Grice heart medicine Here’s hyperbole implicature improper relationship inferences intention to deceive intuitions Jonathan Adler judgement Kent Bach Lewinsky lie iff linguistic error linguistic error/malapropism lying and misleading lying–misleading distinction malapropism mean mental reservation merely misleading metaphor Monica Lewinsky moral significance morally better morally preferable morally revealing morally worse notion of saying one’s oral sex perjury person lies iff philosophy of language priest proposition reason reference responsibility Saddam Hussein saying something false seems sentence uttered sexual relations Solan and Tiersma sort syntactic ellipsis take themself Tony truth value victim of linguistic warranting context weapons of mass wrong