Votes and Violence: Electoral Competition and Ethnic Riots in India
Why do ethnic riots break out when and where they do? Why do some governments try to prevent ethnic riots while others do nothing or even participate in the violence? In this book, Steven I. Wilkinson uses collected data on Hindu-Muslim riots, socio-economic factors and competitive politics in India to test his theory that riots are fomented in order to win elections and that governments decide whether to stop them or not based on the likely electoral cost of doing so. He finds that electoral factors account for most of the state-level variation in Hindu-Muslim riots: explaining for example why riots took place in Gujarat in 2002 but not in many other states where militants tried to foment violence. The general electoral theory he develops for India is extended to Ireland, Malaysia and Romania as Wilkinson shows that similar political factors motivate ethnic violence in many different countries.
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Attempts by Narayana Guru to improve the social conditions of the Ezhavas were successful because missionaries had already started schools and admitted Ezhavas long before Narayana Guru championed their cause. Narayana Guru was using the changes made by the missionaries in a caste-ridden society to further the welfare of Ezhavas. So it was not a pioneering enterprise by the Guru but simply making use of the freedom already obtained by the missionaries for the Ezhavas.
IT'S AN HONEST STUDY. A MUST READ FOR EVERY POLICE OFFICER. RAHUL KUMAR, DSP, UTTAR PRADESH POLICE DEPARTMENT, INDIA.
THE ELECTORAL INCENTIVES FOR ETHNIC VIOLENCE
EXPLAINING TOWNLEVEL VARIATION IN HINDUMUSLIM VIOLENCE
STATE CAPACITY EXPLANATIONS FOR HINDUMUSLIM VIOLENCE
THE CONSOCIATIONAL EXPLANATION FOR HINDUMUSLIM VIOLENCE
THE ELECTORAL INCENTIVES FOR HINDUMUSLIM VIOLENCE
PARTY COMPETITION AND HINDUMUSLIM VIOLENCE
THE ELECTORAL INCENTIVES FOR ETHNIC VIOLENCE IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE