South Asia's Nuclear Security Dilemma: India, Pakistan, and ChinaThe nuclear test explosions in India and Pakistan in 1998, followed by the outbreak of hostilities over Kashmir in 1999, marked a frightening new turn in the ancient, bitter enmity between the two nations. Although the tension was eclipsed by the events of 9/11 and the subsequent American attacks on Afghanistan and Iraq, it has not disappeared, as evidenced by the 2001 attack in the Indian Parliament by Islamic fundamentalists out of Kashmir. By 2002, these two nuclear-armed neighbors seemed to be once again on the brink of war. This book outlines the strategic structure of the rivalry and the dynamic forces driving it, and investigates various possible solutions. The expert contributors focus on the India-Pakistan rivalry, but also consider the China factor in South Asia's nuclear security dilemma. Although essentially political-strategic in its approach, the book includes coverage of opposing military arsenals and the impact of local terrorism on the delicate balance of power. |
What people are saying - Write a review
South Asia's Nuclear Security Dilemma: India, Pakistan, and China is an edited book by Lowell Dittmer. Dittmer is currently working as a professor at the University of California, Berkeley. This book actually comprised of several different articles on the related subject, which are effectively collected and efficiently linked by the writer in 2 main sections; “Political Economy of Minimal Deterrence” and “The Power Structure of the Region”.
Lowell Dittmer, in this book, actually tries to explore the complexities of the security problem in South Asia after the Kargil war between India and Pakistan particularly. This book analysis the domestic and external factors that have, and still are having a very strong influence on deterrence stability in South Asia.
South Asia is a developing region but still the 2 main states of South Asia, which are also the arch rivals, are Nuclear Weapon States; India and Pakistan. The Kargil war between India and Pakistan in 1999, just a year after their nuclear tests, caught more attention by the international community due to international concerns about the risks of breakout of a nuclear war in the region. The war also was a very important event for all the nuclear deterrence theorists as their future assumptions and predictions were proved to be successful.
In this book Dittmer has put together a logically coherent set of topics and authors, which, according to his introduction, uses South Asian nuclearization as a test case to explore “challenges to the international nonproliferation regime in a post–Cold War Unipolar world” and the impact on “development and security among developing countries”.
The first chapter consists of an article by Lawrence Saez, which provides a good overview of the arms race between the two sides and this chapter also gave some evidence to show that the economic imbalance between India and Pakistan had a significant strategic impact on their nuclear programs. This chapter also deals with the unexplored questions regarding economic security issues related to the 1998 nuclear tests of India and Pakistan. All the economic assistance from outside, and the economic sanctions later on, are discussed in detail by Saez in the very first chapter of this book. In the end of chapter 1, the article writer has predicted the future economic costs of nuclear arms race between Indo-Pak.
In continuation to chapter 1, the next chapter by Sumit Ganguly and Kent Biringer also covers the same issue in regards of crisis stability. It firstly gave a brief background of the Indo-Pak rivalry since 1947. The two sides fought 3 direct wars with each other in the years 1948, 1965 and the last in 1971. But after becoming nuclear powers, both the states have successfully avoided a full-scale war with each other though they had some serious crisis or limited wars. The chapter explains that nuclear weapons has helped in Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) and also has forced both the states to co-operate with each other in order to avoid future wars.
Chapter 3 by Dinshaw Mistry is on the strategic significance of India’s nuclear and missile forces provides a detailed account of India’s nuclear projects along with the complete official details of their all missiles including their civilian and defense capabilities. This chapter also explains the advancement of Indian nuclear experts in missiles and space technologies in detail and also the role of missile defense forces is discussed. It also includes the explanation of different new strategic terms and concepts as counter-force, counter-value, Theater Missile Defense, and crisis stability, particularly as applied to South Asia.
The next two chapters are by Rahul Roy Chaudhary (nuclear and naval capabilities) and Hasan Askari Rizvi respectively. Both the writers explore economic, political, and technological dynamics in India and in Pakistan that have determined the bilateral relationship of insecurity. Chapter 4 covers the nuclear and naval capabilities whereas chapter 5 explains the relationship of the two
Contents
The Political Economy of the IndiaPakistan Nuclear | 3 |
Nuclear Crisis Stability in South Asia | 29 |
Military Technology National Power and Regional | 49 |
NuclearRelated Programs | 73 |
Pakistans Nuclear Testing | 97 |
Pakistans Nuclear Doctrine | 110 |
How and What | 137 |
Foe or Friend? The Chinese Assessment of a Rising | 150 |
The Causes and Consequences of ChinaPakistani | 175 |
On the Current Status and Future Outlook | 189 |
Notes | 217 |
About the Editor and Contributors | 257 |
Other editions - View all
South Asia's Nuclear Security Dilemma: India, Pakistan, and China Lowell Dittmer Limited preview - 2015 |
South Asia's Nuclear Security Dilemma: India, Pakistan, and China Lowell Dittmer Limited preview - 2005 |
South Asia's Nuclear Security Dilemma: India, Pakistan, and China Lowell Dittmer Limited preview - 2015 |