Industrial Organization: Theory and Applications
"This book presents the main ideas of modern industrial organization, many of which are explained without using calculus. Only the ability to follow logical arguments is needed for these sections. Oz Shy also provides a very nice introduction to topics which are typically not covered in other texts, namely the basic results about compatibility and the choice of standards as well as a concise analysis of specific industries."
-- Jacques Thisse, Professor of Economics at the Sorbonne and CERAS, Paris This upper-level undergraduate text provides an introduction to industrial organization theory along with applications and nontechnical analyses of the legal system and antitrust laws. Using the modern approach but without emphasizing the mathematical generality inherent in many of the arguments, it bridges the gap between existing nontheoretical texts written for undergraduates and highly technical texts written for graduate students. The book can also be used in masters' programs, and advanced graduate students will find it a convenient guide to modern industrial organization.
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Technology Production Cost and Demand
Markets for Homogeneous Products
Markets for Differentiated Products
Concentration Mergers and Entry Barriers
Quality Durability and Warranties
TwoPart Tariff and PeakLoad
Chapter 13 excluding section 13
Section 14 2
Management Compensation and Regulation
Section 15 5
actions aggregate airline firms analyze antitrust assume assumption best-response functions brand buyers calculate capacity comparison advertising compatible competition components consumer surplus dealer dealerships defined Definition denote deviate differentiated discount durable effort level entry equilibrium prices extensive form games FC network Figure firm's firms produce first-order condition Formally given Hence implies incentive increase incumbent firm industry innovation invest located manufacturer market structure maximize merger monopoly's Nash equilibrium network externalities normal form game number of consumers number of firms outcome output level owner patent player potential entrant price discrimination price game product differentiation profit level profit-maximizing Proposition R&D level regulator restaurant revenue second period seller solve strategy subgame subgame perfect equilibrium subsection sumer sunk cost Suppose tion trigger strategies two-part tariff tying unit cost unit production cost warranty welfare workers yields zero