Terminate Terrorism: Framing, Gaming, and Negotiating ConflictsAmerican policy on terrorism and homeland security since the events of 9/11 reflect well-intentioned efforts to manage and eliminate major international threats. The government has deployed an array of resistance strategies and reform initiatives but without achieving definitive, desired results. International terrorism today poses a major problem for U.S. security. How do threats of terrorism subside? The United States as a superpower has experienced four major episodes of international terrorism: the Cuba skyjacking epidemic (January 1968-February 1973); the Iran hostage crisis (November 1979-January 1981); the Beirut kidnappings in Lebanon (1982-1991); and Al Qaeda suicide bombings that commenced with attacks overseas in late 1990s, graduated to the dramatic events of 2001, and continues with threats today. All these incidents reflect global ideological tension, high drama, and extreme frustration for policymakers who attempted to resolve these conflicts. In first three cases, once defense and deterrence strategies were in place, terrorism was brought under control with mutual agreements between disputants: The U.S. decided to negotiate with terrorists in violation of stated policy. To reach that point, decision-makers shifted their view of the conflict and of their opponent. A new perspective motivated parties to seek resolution through interest-based bargaining. This study develops a framework of termination dynamics drawn from conflict resolution theory and research and applies it to three concluded cases and current Al Qaeda problem, offering a method for tracking progression of terrorist conflict. Addresses central question: how does anti-American terrorism end? Shows uniqueness of anti-American terrorism, why it differs from most terrorist campaigns in other countries. Argues that insight into terrorism causes tells little about terrorism termination processes. Provides detailed case studies of recent U.S. international terrorism episodes. Analyzes specific conditions that bring anti-American terrorism episodes to a close. Shows that how we decide, through cognitive and instrumental thinking, affects terrorism policy solutions. Presents a dynamic framework for ending stalemated, long-term terrorism. Discusses when to negotiate an end to a terrorist problem--Publisher's description. |
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Page 18
... issue in understanding solutions to social conflict , says Carnevale ( 2007 ) . A reasonable question in this ... issues , and motives - in the context of operating environmental circumstances . Important differences exist between the ...
... issue in understanding solutions to social conflict , says Carnevale ( 2007 ) . A reasonable question in this ... issues , and motives - in the context of operating environmental circumstances . Important differences exist between the ...
Page 65
... issue is compensation for the other sides ' concession on the other's low priority issue . Parties stay within the set of issues , specifically what is exchanged to eliminate the terrorist threat , rather than reach out for new issues ...
... issue is compensation for the other sides ' concession on the other's low priority issue . Parties stay within the set of issues , specifically what is exchanged to eliminate the terrorist threat , rather than reach out for new issues ...
Page 154
Framing, Gaming, and Negotiating Conflicts Karen A. Feste. hostage issue . U.S. Tribunal representative Sofaer ( 1999 , 196–197 ) says negotiating with Iran became a big issue for the administration but the appearance of trading hostages ...
Framing, Gaming, and Negotiating Conflicts Karen A. Feste. hostage issue . U.S. Tribunal representative Sofaer ( 1999 , 196–197 ) says negotiating with Iran became a big issue for the administration but the appearance of trading hostages ...
Contents
List of Tables ix | 1 |
Assessment Guidelines | 202 |
Notes | 213 |
Copyright | |
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Terminate Terrorism: Framing, Gaming, and Negotiating Conflicts Karen A. Feste No preview available - 2010 |
Common terms and phrases
adversary Afghanistan agreement aircraft aircraft hijacking airplane to Havana al Qaeda Algiers Accord American hostages anti-American anti-American terrorism Beirut Carter cognitive cognitive framing concessions conflict resolution conflicts of terrorism Cuba Cuban Exiles demands diplomatic dispute enemy fighting forces framing gaming global Havana Outcome Hezbollah high-medium-low hijacker apprehended Hijacking attempt Hijacking of U.S. hostage-taking hostages released imprisoned Initiator Style Iran releases Iranian Iranian assets Iraq Islamic issue jihadi Kidnapping killed leaders Lebanon military million mutual hurting stalemate negotiate with terrorists negotiated settlement negotiation readiness November October October Surprise officials opponent Pakistan Palestinian parties perspective political President problem Qaeda reciprocal exchange regime resolve response returned Saudi Arabia Shah side skyjacking strategy suicide bombing Taliban target government Teheran Terminating Terrorism terrorism conflict terrorist terrorist campaign threat turning points U.S. airplane U.S. citizen U.S. Congress U.S. Embassy U.S. government U.S. Proposal United violence Zartman