The CIA and the U-2 Program, 1954-1974

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DIANE Publishing, 1998 - History - 333 pages
A comprehensive & authoritative history of the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program (MORP), which from 1954 to 1974 developed & operated 2 extraordinary aircraft, the U-2 & the A-12 OXCART. Describes not only the program's technological & bureaucratic aspects, but also its political & international context. The MORP, along with other overhead systems that emerged from it, changed the CIA's work & structure in ways that were both revolutionary & permanent. The formation of the Directorate of S&T in the 1960s, principally to develop & direct reconnaissance programs, is the most obvious legacy of the events in this study.

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Page 124 - if we lost a plane at this stage, it would be almost catastrophic." Eisenhower agreed, and added "Everyone in the world says that in the last six weeks, the US has gained a place it hasn't held since World War II." The country had to "preserve a place that is correct and moral." Still, he worried about those Russians and what they might do with the Red Army, so he...
Page 147 - Union calling for a Soviet answer to US proposals for a "study of the technical aspects of safeguards against the possibility of surprise attack.
Page 26 - DuBridge, President of the California Institute of Technology and Chairman of the...
Page 162 - William E. Burrows, Deep Black: Space Espionage and National Security, New York, Random House, 1986, p.
Page 33 - I [Land] am not sure that we have made it clear that we feel there are many reasons why this activity is appropriate for CIA, always with Air Force assistance. We told you that this seems to us the kind of action and technique that is right for the contemporary version of CIA: a modern and scientific way for an Agency that is always supposed to be looking, to do its looking. Quite strongly, we feel that you must always assert your first right to pioneer in scientific techniques for collecting intelligence...
Page 167 - February of 1960 that he would have "one tremendous asset" in negotiations about his hoped-for treaty with the Russians, and that was his reputation for honesty. "If one of these aircraft were lost when we were engaged in apparently sincere deliberations, it could be put on display in Moscow and ruin my effectiveness.
Page 188 - Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, Foreign and Military Intelligence: Book I, April 26, 1976.
Page 95 - Allen's [Dulles] approach was that we were unlikely to lose one. If we did lose one, the pilot would not survive . . . We were told — and it was part of our understanding of the situation — that it was almost certain that the plane would disintegrate and that we could take it as a certainty that no pilot would survive . . . and that although they would know where the plane came from, it would be difficult to prove it in any convincing way.65 Both these plans assumed a dead pilot.
Page 33 - U-2 system, but he stipulated that it should be handled in an unconventional way so that it would not become entangled in the bureaucracy of the Defense Department or troubled by rivalries among the services.
Page 60 - If uniformed personnel of the armed services of the United States fly over Russia, it is an act of war — legally — and I don't want any part of that.

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