Philosophy of Mind and Phenomenology: Conceptual and Empirical ApproachesThis volume identifies and develops how philosophy of mind and phenomenology interact in both conceptual and empirically-informed ways. The objective is to demonstrate that phenomenology, as the first-personal study of the contents and structures of our mentality, can provide us with insights into the understanding of the mind and can complement strictly analytical or empirically informed approaches to the study of the mind. Insofar as phenomenology, as the study or science of phenomena, allows the mind to appear, this collection shows how the mind can reappear through a constructive dialogue between different ways—phenomenological, analytical, and empirical—of understanding mentality. |
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Contents
What It Is and What It Is | |
The Body | |
The Body and Its Image in the Clinical Encounter | |
Actions Habits and Skilled Expertise | |
The Minds of Others | |
An Exploration | |
Knowing Ones Own Desires | |
Phenomenal Conservatism and the Principle of All Principles | |
Hearing Seeing and Music in the Middle | |
Sartres Phenomenology of Dreaming | |
Defending a Heideggerian Account of Mood | |
A Sartrean Reading | |
Prospects for a Naturalized Phenomenology | |
4e Cognition and the Argument | |
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Philosophy of Mind and Phenomenology: Conceptual and Empirical Approaches Daniel O. Dahlstrom,Walter Hopp No preview available - 2015 |
Common terms and phrases
account of mood action activity agent analysis appears argues aspects attuned through mood awareness behavior beliefs bodily boredom brain Cambridge claim Cognitive Phenomenology cognitive science conception conscious experience consciousness consider constitution desires distinction Dordrecht dream Elpidorou embodied emotions empathy empirical environment epistemic example experienced experiential for-me-ness explain Extended Mind feeling first-person authority for-me-ness Gallagher Heidegger Heidegger’s account hrsg Huemer human Husserl ibid idea image-subject imaginary intentional object intentionality interoception introspective intuitive lived body medical images mental Merleau-Ponty modal mode of presentation Moran narrative naturalized phenomenology neural neurophenomenology Neuroscience Nijhoff one’s other’s Oxford University Press pain patient perceive perceptual experience personal-level perspective phenomenal character Phenomenal Conservatism philosophy of mind problem processes proprioception psychology reflection role Routledge Sartre Sartre’s seems self-awareness sensations sense sensory simulation structure subpersonal theory things thought tonic immobility trans transcendental understanding visual VW bus Walter Hopp Zahavi