Managing Major Hazards: The Lessons of the Moura Mine Disaster
Many organisations live with hazards that have the potential to cause disaster. This was the case at Moura underground coal mine in Central Queensland, where 11 men died in an explosion in 1994.
Andrew Hopkins shows that the explosion was the result of organisational failure, and uses it to draw lessons about managing major hazards. He argues that there are always tell-tale signs of impending disaster, and that organisations need to find ways of gathering this information and reacting to it appropriately. The Moura story also demonstrates the need to move responsibility for risk management up the corporate hierarchy to ensure that it is not overshadowed by production pressures. Otherwise disasters will repeat themselves in horrifyingly similar ways.
Managing Major Hazards is a gripping story and essential reading for occupational health and safety professionals, executives working in hazardous industries, policy makers, and readers interested in risk management and disaster studies.
What people are saying - Write a review
We haven't found any reviews in the usual places.
2 Perspectives on disaster
3 The communication system
the need to structure decision making
5 The failure of management responsibility
7 Was Moura safetyconscious?
8 Production before safety?
10 The safety pays argument
11 The regulatory system
Appendix 1 Company and management hierarchies
Appendix 2 Australian mine disasters
9 The role of BHP
Other editions - View all
accidents action alarm analysis argument Australia Bass Strait behaviour belief benzene Bhopal BHPAC catastrophic risk chapter coal mines concern context control of catastrophic corporate cost culture of denial danger deputies develop disaster prevention duty of care effective EFTPOS employers ensure evidence explosive range failed gas monitoring go underground happened head office health and safety heating hierarchy identify ignition indicator industry inspec inspectorates involved Kianga lessons litres per minute lost time injury LTIFR matter mine's Moura disaster normal accidents North Sea noted occurring oil platform oral communication organisation panel particular Perrow perspectives Piper Alpha possible potential practice prescriptive priority problem procedures production Queensland question rational reports of smells responsibility for safety safe safety management plans safety pays sealed self-regulation senior management shift undermanager specified spontaneous combustion system accidents tion trigger underground that night undermanager-in-charge Union Carbide warning signs Windridge workers