The Philosophy of William JamesH. Holt, 1917 - 246 pages |
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PHILOSOPHY OF WILLIAM JAMES Theodore 1854-1920 Flournoy,William 1842-1910 James,Edwin Bissell 1873 Holt No preview available - 2016 |
Common terms and phrases
absolute abstract actual Agassiz aseity attitude believe Bergson block-universe Charles Renouvier choice conception concrete consciousness constitutes course divine doctrine elements empirical empiricist ence entirely evil existence fact faith feeling final formulæ free-will future hand human hypothesis ideal idealistic ideas immediate experience individual infinite inner intellectual intellectualist James's philosophy John Stuart Mill Josiah Royce lectures less ligion living logical Louis Agassiz matter means mental merely metaphysical method mind monism moral mystical nature never object original ourselves over-beliefs Panpsychism pantheism perience phenomena philoso pirical pluralism Pluralistic Universe point of view possible pragmatic pragmatist present principle psychic psychology pure experience question radical empiricism rationalists reality religion religious experience Renouvier scientific Secrétan sense soul spiritual stream of consciousness subconscious temperament theism theory things thinkers thought tion true truth tychism unity Varieties of Religious whole William James words York
Popular passages
Page 61 - Consider what effects, that might conceivably have practical bearings, we conceive the object of our conception to have. Then, our conception of these effects is the whole of our conception of the object.
Page 176 - I confess that I do not see why the very existence of an invisible world may not in part depend on the personal response which any one of us may make to the religious appeal. God himself, in short, may draw vital strength and increase of very being from our fidelity.
Page 177 - If this life be not a real fight, in which something is eternally gained for the universe by success, it is no better than a game of private theatricals from which one may withdraw at will.
Page 90 - The postulate is that the only things that shall be debatable among philosophers shall be things definable in terms drawn from experience. (Things of an unexperienceable nature may exist ad libitum, but they form no part of the material for philosophic debate...
Page 175 - This feeling, forced on us we know not whence, that by obstinately believing that there are gods (although not to do so would be so easy both for our logic and our...
Page 175 - I can only repeat that this is misapprehension. In concrete, the freedom to believe can only cover living options which the intellect of the individual cannot by itself resolve; and living options never seem absurdities to him who has them to consider. When I look at the religious question as it really puts itself to concrete men, and when I think of all the possibilities which both practically and theoretically it involves, then this command that we shall put a stopper on our heart, instincts, and...
Page 130 - Suppose that the world's author put the case to you before creation, saying: " I am going to make a world not certain to be saved, a world the perfection of which shall be conditional merely, the condition being that each several agent does its own 'level best.
Page 161 - He is assumed as a matter of course to be "one and only" and to be "infinite"; and the notion of many finite gods is one which hardly any one thinks it worth while to consider, and still less to uphold. Nevertheless, in the interests of intellectual clearness, I feel bound to say that religious experience, as we have studied it, cannot be cited as unequivocally supporting the infinitist belief. The only thing that it unequivocally testifies to is * that we can experience union with something larger...
Page 69 - All that is rational is real, and all that is real is rational' seemed to justify the acceptance of things as they were.
Page 38 - Lastly, his posthumous work, which has just appeared (Some Problems of Philosophy. New York, 1911), contains an eloquent dedication to Charles Renouvier, who ". . . was one of the greatest of philosophic characters, and but for the decisive impression made on me in the seventies by his masterly advocacy of pluralism, I might never have got free from the monistic superstition under which I had grown up.