Troubled Partnership: A History of U.S.-Japan Collaboration on the Fs-X Fighter

Front Cover
Transaction Publishers, Jan 1, 1996 - Political Science - 469 pages

During World War II, Japanese fighters, such as the famed Zero, were among the most respected and feared combat aircraft in the world. But for decades following the defeat of Japan in 1945, a variety of political and economic factors prevented Japan from developing its own modern national fighter.

This changed in the 1980s. Japan began independently developing its first world-class fighter since World War II. After several years of contentious negotiations, the Japanese agreed to work with the United States to cooperatively develop a minimally modified F-16, the FS-X. The new fighter, however, has evolved into a world-class aircraft developed largely by Japanese industry primarily due to errors committed by the U.S. side. By the fall of 1995, fifty years after the end of World War II, the Zero for the 1990s will have made its first flight, catapulting Japan into the elite ranks of nations capable of developing the most advanced weapon systems.

In "Troubled Partnership, "Mark Lorell traces the evolution of the FS-X, disclosing the conflicting economic and security objectives advanced by U.S. officials, the flawed U.S. policy of technology reciprocity, and the challenges of international collaboration. Its deep intimacy with the interplay of policy and economy will make this volume of intense interest to political scientists, military studies specialists, historians, and government officials.

 

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Contents

INTRODUCTION
1
WHAT WENT WRONG?
3
ORGANIZATION OF THIS DOCUMENT
7
THE US QUEST FOR TECHNOLOGY RECIPROCITY
9
JAPANS DEFENSE BUILDUP AND THE CONCEPT OF BURDENSHARING
11
DEVELOPING A LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR ACCESS TO JAPANESE DEFENSE TECHNOLOGY
15
New Initiatives from the Reagan Administration
17
Japanese ResistanceAnd Eventual Compromise
19
Clarifying US Access to Japanese Technologies
228
Japanese Frustration Anger and Resistance
231
THE ILLUSION OF A FINAL SETTLEMENT
234
THE SHOWDOWN OVER FSX AND ITS AFTERMATH
239
SELLING FSX TECHNOLOGY BENEFITS TO CONGRESS
242
GAO Questions the Value of Japanese FSX Technology
245
Passage of the Byrd Resolution and Conditional Approval of FSX
247
Experts Challenge Commercial Value of F16 Data for Japan
249

The Exchange of Notes and the Establishment of the Joint Military Technology Commission
24
The US Demands for Free and Automatic Flowback of Derived Technology
27
Negotiating the Implementation Arrangements
29
IN SEARCH OF A TECHNOLOGY
31
Of Gallium Arsenide Integrated Circuits and Military Radars
34
The First TAT Visit to Japan
36
A Brief Glimpse at Japans New Military Radar Technologies
39
Taking a Second Look at Japanese DefenseRelated Technologies
43
Going After the Keiko SurfacetoAir Missile
45
PENTAGON FRUSTRATION ON THE EVE OF FSX
46
JAPANS POSTWAR QUEST FOR A NATIONAL FIGHTER
49
DEVELOPMENT OF JAPANS POSTWAR DEFENSE INDUSTRY
51
Reviving the Postwar Military Aircraft Industry
55
Fighters Versus Commercial Aircraft
56
THE PUSH TOWARD INDIGENOUS MILITARY AIRCRAFT IN THE 1970s
59
INCEPTION OF THE RISING SUN FIGHTER
63
BUILDING THE FIGHTER TECHNOLOGY BASE
73
LEARNING FROM LICENSED PRODUCTION
76
Military Versus Commercial SpinOffs from the F15
79
GAINING EXPERIENCE IN SYSTEM INTEGRATION
81
The F4EJkai Fighter
82
The T4 Jet Trainer
83
TARGETING DEVELOPMENT OF KEY TECHNOLOGIES FOR THE FUTURE FIGHTER
84
Advanced FlightControl Technology
85
Composite Materials and Aircraft Structures
88
The MELCO Active PhasedArray Radar
94
THE BATTLE JOINED STOPPING THE RISING SUN FIGHTER
97
US INDUSTRY CONFRONTS A SHRINKING GLOBAL MARKET
99
THE US GOVERNMENT ENTERS THE FRAY
105
Military and Strategic Reasons Behind the Pentagons Opposition
106
Weinberger Rejects HighPressure Tactics
107
Japan Stresses Its Advanced Fighter Technologies
110
THE PENTAGON PROPOSES MODIFICATION OF A US FIGHTER
111
JAPANESE WORKINGLEVEL RESISTANCE STIFFENS
115
US CONTRACTORS INITIAL MODIFICATION PROPOSALS
116
NEW US DESIGN PROPOSALS OFFER EXTENSIVE MODIFICATION
120
COLLABORATION IMPOSED
129
JAPANESE TECHNOLOGY UNVEILED
130
Delaying the Final Japanese Decision
133
DoD Criticizes Japanese Assumptions on Technology and RD Costs
135
Linking Trade and Security Issues
137
Updated Design Proposals to Meet Japanese Technology Requirements
140
Discounting Japanese Fighter Technology
147
TRADE FRICTIONS AND THE TOSHIBA INCIDENT DOOM AN INDIGENOUS FSX
151
Japan Moves to Preserve Technology Objectives on a Collaborative Program
154
DoDs New Offensive Against Foreign Fighter Programs
156
Elimination of the SX4 Proposal
158
TRANSFORMING THE SX3 TO SERVE JAPANS TECHNOLOGY OBJECTIVES
161
US Acceptance of Japanese Changes to the SX3
164
Japan Agrees to Cooperative Development of the SX3 Upgrade
166
THE STRUGGLE OVER PROGRAM CONTROL
171
INITIAL DISCUSSIONS ON A PROGRAM FRAMEWORK
174
Early Signs of Technology Flowback as a Central Problem
178
Forging a Consensus Position on US Negotiating Objectives
180
Countering the Japanese Proposals
185
NEGOTIATING A FORMAL MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING
186
The Growing Problem of Technology Flowback
188
THE CONFLICT OVER DERIVED VERSUS INDIGENOUS TECHNOLOGY
193
The Problem of US Participation on Development of the Wing
195
The Illusion of a Compromise Working Agreement
196
THE JAPANESE BACKPEDAL
198
THE JAPANESE YIELD TO US PRESSURE
202
THE STORM BREAKS IN CONGRESS
205
ORIGINS OF THE ATTACK ON THE PENTAGONS FSX AGREEMENT
209
PRODUCTION WORKSHARE AND THE TWOWAY TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY
213
Debating the Value of Access to Japanese Technology
215
COMMERCE VERSUS DEFENSE
220
Victories for the Department of Commerce
223
IMPOSING NEW CONDITIONS ON THE JAPANESE
225
CONTINUING CONGRESSIONAL OPPOSITION GROWING JAPANESE ANGER
255
The Campaign to Override the Bush Veto of the Byrd Resolution
258
JAPAN MOVES TO TRANSFORM FSX
261
Japans Decision to Develop the FlightControl Computer Software
262
The Japanese Move Toward a Unique National Wing Design
263
Renewal of the Dispute Over US Access to Wing Technology
267
Japanese Complaints About the Transfer of F16 Data
270
Japanese Control over FSX Design Formally Confirmed
273
THE RISING SUN FIGHTER REBORN?
279
CONTROVERSY OVER COST AND SCHEDULE
281
Reports of Cost Growth and Schedule Slippage
282
Japan Blames US Government and Contractors for Cost Growth
283
More Extensive Modifications as a Cause of Cost Growth
285
The 1989 Debate and the Evolution of the FSX Design
293
The Politics of Cost Growth
297
The Continuing Question of Cost Growth
301
The Effects of Cost Growth on Quality Workshare
304
Dropping the Maneuvering Canards
307
Scaling Back Other Work Tasks to Save Costs
308
INDIGENIZATION OF FSX COMPONENTS AND RELATED TECHNOLOGIES
310
The Debate over Japanese Licensed Production of US Components
312
The US Adopts a HardLine Position
314
Even More Indigenous Development
315
THE FIRST THREE YEARS OF RD GAINING ACCESS TO JAPANESE FSX TECHNOLOGIES
319
TRANSFERRING THE WING TECHNOLOGY
320
The Initial CouponTest Failure
322
The Integral Tank Test
324
GAO Confirms Transfer of the Wing Data
326
ACCESS TO THE FOUR JAPANESE AVIONICS SYSTEMS
329
Focus on the MELCO APA Radar
330
US Radar Specialists Visit Japan
331
US Concerns Over Technology Transfer
332
Efforts to Interest US Industry in MELCO Radar Technology
335
Negotiating to Purchase TR Modules for Testing in the United States
338
The FSX Radar Technology Symposium in Washington
343
A Purchase Agreement for TR Modules Is Sealed
344
OTHER NONDERIVED SYSTEMS AND THE JAEI TECHNOLOGY SCANDAL
346
The JAEI Scandal and Its Effects on the IRS and FlightControl Computer System
347
Japan Reacts to US Sanctions
349
DERIVED TECHNOLOGY AND THE QUESTION OF CATEGORIZATION
352
AN INTERIM TECHNOLOGY BALANCE SHEET
357
TRANSFERRING US TECHNOLOGY TO JAPAN
358
BENEFITS TO US INDUSTRY
361
Revenue and Jobs
362
Flowback and Access to Japanese Technology
364
A TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER DRAW?
371
LONGTERM BENEFITS FOR JAPAN
372
Stopping Indigenous Development
373
Pentagon Goals for Cooperative Development of the FSX
377
An Extensive Modification Program Approaching Indigenous Development
379
The FSX Program Contradicts Many Original Pentagon Objectives
387
NEXT STEPS
389
Benefits of Production for the United States
390
Risks of Cancellation
391
How to Do Better
393
RETHINKING COLLABORATION
397
WHAT WENT WRONG?
398
Collaboration Imposed
399
The Lack of US Influence over the Technological Evolution of the FSX
400
Japanese Military RD Capabilities Underestimated
406
Conflicting US Policy Goals
409
Misguided Policy on Technology Transfer and Flowback
414
GAINING ACCESS TO FOREIGN TECHNOLOGIES
418
The Case of the X31 Fighter Technology Demonstrator
420
CODEVELOPMENT PROLIFERATES MILITARY RD CAPABILITIES
424
REFERENCES
429
INDEX
453
Copyright

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