Emotions in the Moral LifeRobert C. Roberts extends to the moral life the account of emotions presented in his Emotions: An Essay in Aid of Moral Psychology (2003), that they are "concern-based construals." In this book the author explains how emotions can be a basis for moral judgments, how they account for the deeper moral identity of actions we perform, how they are constitutive of morally valenced personal relationships like friendship, enmity, collegiality and parenthood, and how both pleasant and unpleasant emotions interact with our personal wellbeing (eudaimonia). He argues that none of these dimensions of emotions' values is reducible to any of the others. He continues by sketching how all of these moral dimensions contribute to emotions' participation, in diverse ways, in our virtues and vices. |
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Contents
an overview | 25 |
Emotions perception and moral judgment | 38 |
Objections to the perception thesis | 68 |
Emotional truth | 91 |
Emotions and actions | 113 |
Personal relationships | 135 |
Emotions and happiness | 157 |
Diversity and connection among the virtues | 189 |
212 | |
218 | |
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Common terms and phrases
action affect anger angry Anna Anna Karenina Aristotle badminton behavior benefit chap chapter character characteristic child Christian compassion concern concern-based construals consequences construe contempt courage defining proposition deontological desire discussion disposition doesn’t double-crested cormorants duck—rabbit emotion type emotion’s emotional truth envy epistemic eudaimonia evaluative example experience express fear feel figure find first fish fish fit fitting friendship generosity gratitude happiness hedonic human nature important indignation injustice intrinsic Joseph Jastrow justice justified kind Levin Liza metaphysical attunement Meursault Miss Havisham moral concepts moral frameworks moral judgments moral outlook moral theory motivation negative Nicomachean Ethics object obligation Oblonsky one’s passion people’s perceive perhaps personal relationships phenomenal content philosophical pleasure present Prinz properties qualia reason reflection relational respect response role satisfied seems sense of duty sense perception sensory significant silliness situation Slote Stoic Stoicism things tidy traits virtue ethics virtuous visual wellbeing