Justifying Emotions: Pride and Jealousy
The two central emotions of pride and jealousy have long been held to have no role in moral judgements, and have been a source of controversy in both ethics and moral psychology. Kristjan Kristjansson challenges this common view and argues that emotions are central to moral excellence and that both pride and jealousy are indeed ingredients of a well-rounded virtuous life.
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actions anger angry argue argument Aristotelian Aristotle Aristotle’s basic behaviour beliefs Ben-Ze’ev Cambridge University Press character claim cognitive theories cognitivism common compassion conception concern consider deontological desire discussion dispositions distinction emotional excellence Emotional Intelligence eudaimonia example experience fact favour feel G. E. M. Anscombe human Hursthouse Ibid ideal indignation instance invidious envy irrational jealous judgements kind Kohlberg’s Kristjánsson lack less liberal megalopsychos moral and emotional moral education moral luck moral theory moral virtue morally justified nature negative negative duty Nicomachean Ethics Nussbaum objection one’s oneself particular emotions people’s perhaps personhood philosophical positive postmodernism postmodernist present pride and jealousy prideful person principle psychological question rational realise reason responsibility role Rorty Schadenfreude seems self-esteem self-respect sense sexual jealousy shame simple pride simply Social specific Stephansson Subtlety of Emotions teacher things typically undeserved utilitarian virtue ethicists Virtue Ethics virtuous