Religion, Interpretation, and Diversity of Belief: The Framework Model from Kant to Durkheim to Davidson
Often different religious traditions offer very different pictures of the world. In fact, religions are so fascinating partly because they present alternative pictures of the nature of time, space, persons, food, community, life, death, and so on. How are we to make sense of this radical diversity of belief? The most common response is to say that religions are alternative conceptual frameworks or schemes, whose categories organize experience in sometimes diverse ways. On this view of the framework model of religious belief we cannot map religious frameworks onto a single, comprehensive grid because they themselves function as the maps. In this sense, the Buddhist and Baptist are sometimes said to live in different worlds.Religion, Interpretation, and Diversity of Belief traces the history of the framework model from Kant to Durkheim, and then argues for its replacement. Rather than seeing religions as all-encompassing grids, we must recognize that they themseleves are constrained in at least two unavoidable ways: first, by the formal rules that make human experience possible at all, and second, by the fact that as language users we must presuppose that we hold the vast bulk of our beliefs in common. Given these constraints, we can then see religious differences, however dramatic, as relatively limited and largely theoretical.The framework model is deeply entrenched in those disciplines central to the study of religion, especially so in philosophy, sociology, anthropology, psychology, and theology. The negative thrust of this is to suggest this allegiance needs to be reconsidered. Positively, the book sketches a picture of linguistic interpretation on which our differences, religious or otherwise, stand out against the background of what we have in common
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alternative conceptual antiskeptical argue argument Azande Bororo causal Chapter charity claim coherence conceptual frameworks conceptual scheme constraints criticism David Bloor Davidson Davidsonian discussion distinction diversity of religious Durkheimian E. E. Evans-Pritchard Elementary Forms Emile Durkheim empiricism epistemic epistemological epistemological skepticism epistemology example first-person forms of receptivity framework model Geertz Hilary Putnam holistic human idea intuition judgments Kant Kant's Kantian kheim knowledge LePore logical model of religious moral nature necessary and universal necessity and universality neutral content notion organizing scheme parrot Philosophy point of view possible experience presuppose primitive priori Pure Reason question Rationality reality relation relativism relativistic religion religious belief religious narrative religious studies representations rience Rorty scendental sense social society Sociology Sociology of Knowledge space strategy subject matters synthesis theoretical theory things thought tion transcen transcendental Transcendental Idealism true Truth and Interpretation understanding unity of experience unity of reason universe of discourse
Page 197 - The real morality of actions, their merit or guilt, even that of our own conduct, thus remains entirely hidden from us. Our imputations can refer only to the empirical character. How much of this character is ascribable to the pure effect of freedom, how much to mere nature, that is, to faults of temperament for which there is no responsibility, or to its happy constitution...