Foundations and Applications of Decision Theory, Volume 1C. A. Hooker, J. J. Leach, E. F. McClennen 1. INTRODUCTION In the Spring of 1975 we held an international workshop on the Foundations and Application of Decision Theory at the University of Western Ontario. To help structure the workshop into ordered and manageable sessions we distri buted the following statement of our goals to all invited participants. They in turn responded with useful revisions and suggested their own areas of interest. Since this procedure provided the eventual format of the sessions, we include it here as the most appropriate introduction to these collected papers result ing from the workshop. The reader can readily gauge the approximation to our mutual goals. 2. STATEMENT OF OBJECTIVES AND RATIONALE (Attached to this statement is a bibliography; names of persons cited in the statement and writing in this century will be found referenced in the biblio graphy-certain 'classics' aside. ) 2 . 1. Preamble We understand in the following the Theory of Decisions in a broader sense than is presently customary, construing it to embrace a general theory of decision-making, including social, political and economic theory and applica tions. Thus, we subsume the Theory of Games under the head of Decision Theory, regarding it as a particularly clearly formulated version of part of the general theory of decision-making. |
Contents
Abstract This paper has a threefold purpose First it presents a detailed analysis | 4 |
The Logarithmic Tracing Procedure LoTP | 13 |
Criticisms of the Tracing Procedure | 24 |
Copyright | |
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Other editions - View all
Foundations and Applications of Decision Theory Clifford Alan Hooker,J. J. Leach,Edward Francis MacClennen No preview available - 1978 |
Foundations and Applications of Decision Theory, Volume 2 Clifford A. Hooker,J. J. Leach,E. F. McClennen No preview available - 1978 |
Common terms and phrases
A₁ A₂ action actors akrasia alternative applied approach argument assigned assume assumption axioms Bayesian choose compute concept confirmational commitment conflict consensual weights convex set coordination problems credal decision model decision problem Decision Theory decision-making defined desires dominance E-admissible epistemic game equilibrium point evaluation example expected utility gamble game theory given goals H₁ H₂ Harsanyi heliostatic Hence hierarchy hypotheses interaction iterative logic mathematical matrix maximizing expected utility metagame method minimax theory mixed strategy n-tuples Newcomb's Newcomb's Problem non-cooperative non-cooperative games normal form normative notion Nozick objects opponent optimal options outcomes payoff person player possible predicted preferences prior probability prior probability distribution prob psychological pure strategy Q-function rational agent rational choice reasoning regress relevant representation represented requires result S₁ situation social choice solution sort stochastically independent strategy space subgame suppose theory of rational tracing procedure unique utility function