Moral Realism and the Foundations of Ethics
This book is a systematic and constructive treatment of a number of traditional issues at the foundations of ethics. These issues concern the objectivity of ethics, the possibility and nature of moral knowledge, the relationship between the moral point of view and a scientific or naturalist world-view, the nature of moral value and obligation, and the role of morality in a person's rational lifeplan. In striking contrast to traditional and more recent work in the field, David Brink offers an integrated defense of the objectivity of ethics.
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MORAL REALISM AND MORAL INQUIRY
EXTERNALIST MORAL REALISM
A realist explanation of the actionguiding
A COHERENTIST MORAL EPISTEMOLOGY
MORAL REALISM AND THE isOUGHT THESIS
A POSTERIORI OBJECTIONS TO MORAL REALISM
The separateness of persons
Coherence internalism and externalism
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accept action actual agents antirealist appeal argue argument assume attitudes claims coherence coherence theory coherentism commitments conception concern considerations considered moral beliefs consists constituted constructivism construed course demands deny depend desires disagreement distinction distinguish distribution epistemological ethics evidence existence explain explanatory facts and properties foundational foundationalism hold human ideals identity implications important independent interests internalism intuitionism is/ought thesis issues justification Kantian kind knowledge least less matter meaning metaphysical moral beliefs moral facts moral judgments moral realism moral theory motives natural noncognitivist nonmoral objective obligations particular perhaps person physical plausible political possible practical preferences premises principle projects psychological question rational Rawls realization reason recognize regard reject relations reliable represent requires rules seems sense skeptical social sort statements strong subjective things tion traditional true truth utilitarianism valuable welfare wrong