Moral Realism and the Foundations of Ethics

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Cambridge University Press, Feb 24, 1989 - Philosophy - 340 pages
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This book is a systematic and constructive treatment of a number of traditional issues at the foundations of ethics. These issues concern the objectivity of ethics, the possibility and nature of moral knowledge, the relationship between the moral point of view and a scientific or naturalist world-view, the nature of moral value and obligation, and the role of morality in a person's rational lifeplan. In striking contrast to traditional and more recent work in the field, David Brink offers an integrated defense of the objectivity of ethics.
 

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Contents

MORAL REALISM AND MORAL INQUIRY
14
EXTERNALIST MORAL REALISM
37
A realist explanation of the actionguiding
78
A COHERENTIST MORAL EPISTEMOLOGY
100
MORAL REALISM AND THE isOUGHT THESIS
144
A POSTERIORI OBJECTIONS TO MORAL REALISM
171
37
200
OBJECTIVE UTILITARIANISM
211
Rights
268
The separateness of persons
283
50
286
Conclusion
290
Coherence internalism and externalism
296
Rawlsian constructivism
303
52
315
Bibliography
323

43
224
objective utilitarianism
237
Objective utilitarian explanations
245
Interpersonal comparisons of welfare
252
45
262

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