Simulating Minds: The Philosophy, Psychology, and Neuroscience of Mindreading
People are minded creatures; we have thoughts, feelings and emotions. More intriguingly, we grasp our own mental states, and conduct the business of ascribing them to ourselves and others without instruction in formal psychology. How do we do this? And what are the dimensions of our grasp of the mental realm? In this book, Alvin I. Goldman explores these questions with the tools of philosophy, developmental psychology, social psychology and cognitive neuroscience. He refines an approach called simulation theory, which starts from the familiar idea that we understand others by putting ourselves in their mental shoes. Can this intuitive idea be rendered precise in a philosophically respectable manner, without allowing simulation to collapse into theorizing? Given a suitable definition, do empirical results support the notion that minds literally create (or attempt to create) surrogates of other peoples mental states in the process of mindreading? Goldman amasses a surprising array of evidence from psychology and neuroscience that supports this hypothesis.
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Conceptualizing Simulation Theory
The Rationality Theory
The ChildScientist Theory
The Modularity Theory
Simulation in LowLevel Mindreading
HighLevel Simulational Mindreading
Ontogeny Autism Empathy and Evolution
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3-year-olds action activity amygdala approach attributor autism Baron-Cohen behavior belief brain Cambridge causal chapter child child-scientist cognitive science cortex deficit desire Developmental Psychology disgust distinctive domain E-imagination emotion empathy evidence example experience facial expressions false-belief tasks fear first-person fMRI folk psychology functional Gallese Gopnik high-level hypothesis imagination imitation impaired infants inference inhibitory control input intentional intentional stance interpretation introspection involves knowledge Leslie low-level mechanism Meltzoff mental concepts mental simulation mental-state concepts mindreading mirror neurons modularity module motor motor imagery naıve neural Neuroscience Nichols and Stich normal object observed one’s Oxford people’s perception person perspective taking philosophers philosophy of mind predict pretend problem properties propositional attitudes Psychology question rationality reasoning recognition representations role similar simulation heuristic simulation theory simulationist social story subjects target theoretical theory of mind theory-theorist thesis third-person mindreading token ToMM understanding University Press
Page 5 - I try to show that when we describe people as exercising qualities of mind, we are not referring to occult episodes of which their overt acts and utterances are effects; we are referring to those overt acts and utterances themselves.
Page 8 - Add also all the platitudes to the effect that one mental state falls under another — 'toothache is a kind of pain', and the like. Perhaps there are platitudes of other forms as well. Include only platitudes which are common knowledge among us — everyone knows them, everyone knows that everyone else knows them, and so on.