Perspectives on Positive Political Economy
James E. Alt, Kenneth A. Shepsle
Cambridge University Press, Sep 28, 1990 - Business & Economics - 268 pages
This volume serves as an introduction to the new field of positive political economy and the various economic and political processes with which it is concerned. Grounded in the rational-actor methodology of microeconomics, positive political economy is devoted to the dual analysis of the role of economic behavior in political processes and of political behavior and constraints in economic exchange. The field has focused on three main subjects of study: models of collective action in industrialized democracies; the organization of markets and alternative mechanisms of exchange in the Third World; and the analysis of the role of transaction costs in the development and functioning of political and economic institutions. Developments in all of these areas are covered in the book. In the first part of the book, two chapters are devoted to explaining the evolution of the positive political economy approach; the first chapter focusing on microfoundations and the second on macrophenomena. In the second part of the book, three chapters demonstrate applications of the approach to the analysis of various forms of economic and political organizations. In the concluding section, four chapters discuss the research programs that have developed out of four different focuses of analysis: individual decision, exchange transactions, rent-seeking and indivisibilities.
What people are saying - Write a review
We haven't found any reviews in the usual places.
The emerging discipline of political economy
Macropolitical economy in the field of development
Bargaining costs influence costs and the organization of economic activity
Corporate culture and economic theory
Amenity potential indivisibilities and political competition
Political science and rational choice
Other editions - View all
amenity potential analysis argument arrangement assets assumption authority bargaining costs behavior benefits bill business firms buyer candidates capital central collective action competitive consumers corporate culture costly decision makers demand economic theory economists efficient elections enforcement equilibrium ex ante example exchange expected explain firm’s focal folk theorem function game theory Gordon Tullock ical incentives individuals indivisibilities inefficient influence costs institutions interests internal constituency investment involved less maximize median voter Median Voter Theorem ment microeconomics Milgrom monopolies Nash equilibrium nomic observable organization organization’s outcomes output paradigm party’s payment payoffs player policies political economy political parties political science political scientists positive political economy preferences principle problem production programs quasi-rents rational choice relationship rent seeking reputation require calculus role rule social science specific strategy supplier suppose theoretical tion transaction costs transaction-cost Tullock unforeseen contingencies utility voting Williamson Yoram Barzel