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A. E. Taylor absolute abstract activity actual appear autres bien body Bradley C'est choses cism common sense concepts concrete conjunctive relation conscience consciousness continuous d'une definite dialectic disjunctions doctrine dualisme empiricist ence essay exist experienced external F. H. Bradley fact fait feel felt function humanism humanistic ideas inner intellectual Journal of Philosophy kind knower knowledge l'expérience logical matière Meaning of Truth ment mental metaphysical mind monisme nature nerve-cells ness notion object panpsychic percept perience physical physique postulate pragmatic present principle Principles of Psychology Problems of Philosophy Professor Psychology and Scientific pure experience qu'elle qu'il question radical empiricism rationalistic réalité reality rela reprinted retrospective riences Scientific Methods seems self-transcendency sensation Shadworth Hodgson sort stand substitute terminate theory things thought through-and-through tion tout transitions treat true understand whole words World of Pure
Page 42 - To be radical, an empiricism must neither admit into its constructions any element that is not directly experienced, nor exclude from them any element that is directly experienced. For such a philosophy, the relations that connect experiences must themselves be experienced relations, and any kind of relation experienced must be accounted as 'real' as anything else in the system.
Page 2 - consciousness,' when once it has evaporated to this estate of pure diaphaneity, is on the point of disappearing altogether. It is the name of a nonentity, and has no right to a place among first principles. Those who still cling to it are clinging to a mere echo, the faint rumor left behind by the disappearing 'soul
Page vii - empiricism,' because it is contented to regard its most assured conclusions concerning matters of fact as hypotheses liable to modification in the course of future experience ; and I say
Page 3 - For twenty years past I have mistrusted "consciousness" as an entity; for seven or eight years past I have suggested its non-existence to my students, and tried to give them its pragmatic equivalent in realities of experience. It seems to me that the hour is ripe for it to be openly and universally discarded.
Page 25 - Consciousness connotes a kind of external relation, and does not denote a special stuff or way of being. The peculiarity of our experiences, that they not only are, but are known, which their "conscious" quality is invoked to explain, is better explained by their relations — these relations themselves being experiences — to one another.
Page 168 - efficacies' there may really be in this extraordinary universe it is impossible to conceive of any one of them being either lived through or authentically known otherwise than in this dramatic shape of something sustaining a felt purpose against felt obstacles, and overcoming or being overcome. What ' sustaining ' means here is clear to anyone who has lived through the experience, but to no one else; just as 'loud,' 'red,' 'sweet,' mean something only to beings with ears, eyes, and tongues.
Page 103 - In short, there are two principles which I cannot render consistent, nor is it in my power to renounce either of them, viz. that all our distinct perceptions are distinct existences, and that the mind never perceives any real connexion among distinct existences.
Page 4 - My thesis is that if we start with the supposition that there is only one primal stuff or material in the world, a stuff of which everything is composed, and if we call that stuff "pure experience...
Page 4 - There is, I mean, no aboriginal stuff or quality of being, contrasted with that of which material objects are made, out of which our thoughts of them are made ; but there is a function in experience which thoughts perform, and for the performance of which this quality of being is invoked. That function is knowing. 'Consciousness' is supposed necessary to explain the fact that things not only are, but get reported, are known.