Counting the Many: The Origins and Limits of Supermajority RuleSupermajority rules govern many features of our lives in common: from the selection of textbooks for our children's schools to residential covenants, from the policy choices of state and federal legislatures to constitutional amendments. It is usually assumed that these rules are not only normatively unproblematic but necessary to achieve the goals of institutional stability, consensus, and minority protections. In this book, Melissa Schwartzberg challenges the logic underlying the use of supermajority rule as an alternative to majority decision making. She traces the hidden history of supermajority decision making, which originally emerged as an alternative to unanimous rule, and highlights the tensions in the contemporary use of supermajority rules as an alternative to majority rule. Although supermajority rules ostensibly aim to reduce the purported risks associated with majority decision making, they do so at the cost of introducing new liabilities associated with the biased judgments they generate and secure. |
Contents
Acclamation and Aggregation in | 19 |
Medieval | 49 |
Unanimity and Supermajority Rule | 71 |
Majority Rule | 105 |
Constitutionalism without Supermajorities | 146 |
Constitutionalism under Complex Majoritarianism | 182 |
Conclusion | 205 |
| 217 | |
| 231 | |
Other editions - View all
Counting the Many: The Origins and Limits of Supermajority Rule Melissa Schwartzberg Limited preview - 2014 |
Counting the Many: The Origins and Limits of Supermajority Rule Melissa Schwartzberg No preview available - 2013 |
Common terms and phrases
acclamation acclamatory Ackerman Adam Przeworski aggregative alternative areopagus argued argument assembly Athenian Athens ballot believe bias bicameral cardinals Chapter cheirotonia choice citizens coercion complex majoritarianism Condorcet consensus consti constitutional amendment constitutional change constitutionalism context Council counted vote decision rule defend deliberation deliberative deliberative assemblies democracy democratic decision dignity electoral emerged enable ensure fallibility favor filibuster fundamental gerousia important individual judgments insofar instance institutions interests ity rule judge jurors jury theorem justified legislation legislature logic majority decision majority rule majority vote margin mechanism ment moral norms ofthe one’s outcome papal elections particular partisan phronesis political preferences problem procedure proposed protect Pufendorf reason referendum risk Rousseau same-sex marriage Schwartzberg secure Senate simple majority stability status quo status quo bias suggested superma supermajoritarian supermajority rules supermajority threshold Third Lateran Council tion tive two-thirds U.S. Constitution unanimity rule verdict voters voting rules vulnerable minorities
Bibliographic information
| Title | Counting the Many: The Origins and Limits of Supermajority Rule Volume 10 of Cambridge Studies in the Theory of Democracy |
| Author | Melissa Schwartzberg |
| Publisher | Cambridge University Press, 2013 |
| ISBN | 1107433649, 9781107433649 |
| Length | 264 pages |
| Subjects | › History / Social History Political Science / History & Theory |
| Export Citation | BiBTeX EndNote RefMan |