Modeling Rationality, Morality, and Evolution
Oxford University Press, 1998 - Philosophy - 463 pages
This collection focuses on questions that arise when morality is considered from the perspective of recent work on rational choice and evolution. Linking questions like "Is it rational to be moral?" to the evolution of cooperation in "The Prisoners Dilemma," the book brings together new work using models from game theory, evolutionary biology, and cognitive science, as well as from philosophical analysis. Among the contributors are leading figures in these fields, including David Gauthier, Paul M. Churchland, Brian Skyrms, Ronald de Sousa, and Elliot Sober.
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MODELING SOCIAL INTERACTION
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action agent or player agent X altruism argument assumption Axelrod behaviour Cambridge choice combinations choose co-operative co-ordination collectively rational concept Conditional Co-operation consider Constrained Maximization constraints correlated equilibrium correlation decision procedure decision rules decision theory discussion dominant economic event matrix evolution evolutionarily stable strategy evolutionary game evolutionary game theory example expected utility exploitation Figure finite full information function game theory Gauthier genetic given group identity indeterminacy problem individuals input-output loops intention interaction interpersonal mixed strategies move Nash equilibrium Newcomb's problem node norms one-shot one's outcome outcome-oriented reasons pair paradox partner payoffs PD game PD with full play population possible preferences principle Prisoner's Dilemma programs pure strategy ranking rule rational choice rational deliberation recognition rule reflectively rational relevant repeated game replicator dynamics requires result selection sequence of games situation social dilemmas strategy structure subjects tion tournament values XPD2