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The Science of Ethics as Based on the Science of Knowledge
Johann Gottlieb Fichte,William Torrey Harris
No preview available - 2015
absolute according activity actual altogether arises assertion become conscious body categorical imperative causality cerning character cognition command common conception condition connection conscience consciousness contemplation conviction deduced dependent determined determinedness dition duty Egohood end and aim end of reason enjoyment established esteem exist explained external feeling final end Firstly freedom ground Hence higher immediately immoral impelled independent individual intelligence investigation Kant law of reflection likewise limited limitedness manifest manifold manner matter means mediately merely mode of thinking moral law moreover natural impulse necessarily necessary never obedience object occurs original ourselves perception philosophy posited possible precisely present preservation presuppose presupposition principle produce proposition rational rational psychology realize reciprocal reflection regard relation remains representation requires result sake scholar science of morality Science of Rights self-activity self-determination sensuous world signifies speak sphere standpoint subjective theoretical thing thought tion transcendental true uncon utterly vidual vocation whereof whole
Page 29 - Whatsoever is dependent, conditioned, or grounded through another maybe cognized, in so far as it is thus, mediately, namely, from a cognition of that upon which it depends, or in which it is grounded. Thus, for instance, if a ball is set in motion, I can certainly have immediate perception of its movement, of the point from which it starts, the point where it rests, and the celerity with which it moves; but I could likewise obtain a knowledge of all this if I were merely made acquainted with the...
Page 135 - My impulse as a being of nature, and my tendency as pure spirit : are they two different impulses ? By no means. From the transcendental point of view, both are one and the same original impulse, which constitutes my being, only regarded from two different sides. For I am subject-object, and in the identity and inseparability of both consists my true being.
Page 17 - ... thus discover it, if he but closely observes himself; man may simply accept it as such fact, may rest content to have discovered that it is thus, without inquiring in what manner and from what grounds it becomes thus. Perhaps he may even freely resolve, from inclination, to place unconditioned faith in the requirements of that impulsion, and actually to think, as his highest destination, what that impulsion represents to him as such; nay, perhaps even to act constantly in conformity with this...
Page 159 - The utter annihilation of the individual and submission thereof in the absolute and pure form of reason, or in God, is most certainly the final end of finite reason.
Page 1 - For this contentless universal consciousness is only another name for the contentless unlimited, infinite of the ego-universal. A quotation from Fichte may here be useful as a comparison. Thus he says in the introduction to his Science of Ethics : " How an object can ever become a subject, or how a being can ever become an object of representation : this curious change will never be explained by anyone who does not find a point where the objective and subjective are not distinguished at all, but...
Page 308 - ... short term. Once secure property has vanished as the goal of acquisition, the intrinsic connection between the experiences of the individual disappears. Concern for property under orderly competition and the rule of law has always been constitutive of the ego. Slaves and paupers had no individuality. The "premise of all my acting in the sensuous world, can only be as part of that sensuous world, if I live amongst other free beings. This determined part of the world ... is called . . . my property."1...
Page 246 - ... an impulse to act in a certain manner altogether independent of any external purpose or motive, and merely for the sake of such acting, and this impulse is called the Moral Law. It is a determinedness of freedom : freedom determined by its own absoluteness, and may be put in a formula as follows: Act in such a manner that the maxim, of your will can be valid always as the principle of a universal legislation.
Page 33 - The essential character of the Ego, through which it distinguishes itself from all that is outside of it, consists in its tendency to self-activity for the sake of selfactivity ; and it is this tendency which is thought, when the Ego is thought in and for itself without relation to anything external.