## Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, Volume 1This is the first volume of the Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, to be followed by two additional volumes. Game Theory has developed greatly in the last decade, and today it is an essential tool in much of economic theory. The three volumes will cover the fundamental theoretical aspects, a wide range of applications to economics, several chapters on applications to political science, and individual chapters on relations with other disciplines. The topics covered in the present volume include chess-playing computers, an introduction to the non-cooperative theory, repeated games, bargaining theory, auctions, location, entry deterrence, patents, the cooperative theory and its applications, and the relation between Game Theory and ethics. For more information on the Handbooks in Economics series, please see our home page on http://www.elsevier.nl/locate/hes |

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### Contents

Pure strategies | 29 |

Chapter 2 | 39 |

Games of perfect information | 42 |

Copyright | |

52 other sections not shown

### Other editions - View all

Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, Volume 2 R.J. Aumann,S. Hart Limited preview - 1992 |

### Common terms and phrases

agents allocation analysis applications assignment assume assumption auction balanced bargaining behavior bidders buyer called chapter choice choose coalition common competitive concept conclusion condition consider consists continuous convergence convex core corresponding cost defined Definition demand denote described distribution dominant Econometrica entrant entry equilibrium example exists expected finite firms function Game Theory given implies incentive incomplete information incumbent individual Journal of Economic licensing limit Mathematical means measure mechanism moves Note observed obtain offer optimal outcome pair particular payoff play player positive possible preferences probability problem profit proof proved pure repeated respect Review satisfies seller sequence Shapley side signal solution space stable matching stable sets stage strategy structure subset symmetric Theorem theory traders unique University utility vector weak winning