Gunnar Bj÷rnsson, Fredrik Bj÷rklund, Caj Strandberg
Oxford University Press, 2015 - Philosophy - 306 pages
Motivational internalism-the idea that there is an intrinsic or necessary connection between moral judgment and moral motivation-is a central thesis in a number of metaethical debates. In conjunction with a Humean picture of motivation, it provides a challenge for cognitivist theories that
take moral judgments to concern objective aspects of reality. Versions of internalism have potential implications for moral absolutism, realism, non-naturalism, and rationalism. Being a constraint on more detailed conceptions of moral motivation and moral judgment, it is also directly relevant to
wider issues in moral psychology. But internalism is a controversial thesis, and the apparent possibility of amoralists and the rejection of strong forms of internalism have also been seen as problems for non-cognitivists.
This volume's thirteen new essays and introduction are meant to help readers appreciate state-of-the-art of research on internalism, to identify connections between various aspects of the debate, and to deepen discussion of a number of central aspects of metaethics. The introductory chapter provides