Motivational InternalismGunnar Björnsson, Fredrik Björklund, Caj Strandberg Motivational internalism-the idea that there is an intrinsic or necessary connection between moral judgment and moral motivation-is a central thesis in a number of metaethical debates. In conjunction with a Humean picture of motivation, it provides a challenge for cognitivist theories that take moral judgments to concern objective aspects of reality. Versions of internalism have potential implications for moral absolutism, realism, non-naturalism, and rationalism. Being a constraint on more detailed conceptions of moral motivation and moral judgment, it is also directly relevant to wider issues in moral psychology. But internalism is a controversial thesis, and the apparent possibility of amoralists and the rejection of strong forms of internalism have also been seen as problems for non-cognitivists. This volume's thirteen new essays and introduction are meant to help readers appreciate state-of-the-art of research on internalism, to identify connections between various aspects of the debate, and to deepen discussion of a number of central aspects of metaethics. The introductory chapter provides |
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accordance action agent amoralists argued argument attitudes behavior Björnsson Cambridge canonical method claim Cleckley cognitive dissonance cognitivism cognitivists competent concepts debate desire-like dicto dispositions distinction Dreier emotions empirical Ethics Evaluative Judgement Internalism evidence example explain expressivism expressivist externalism fact first-order form of internalism function Hume Hume’s Humean hybrid hybrid theories internalist irrational Johnston Judgement-Sensitive judgment and motivation kind Korsgaard mental ments metaethical Michael modal moral beliefs moral judg moral judgments moral motivation Moral Psychology Moral Realism motivational internalism naturalistic realism necessarily no-common-content non-cognitivism non-cognitivist non-instrumental desires normative judgment object one’s Oxford University Press Parfit person Philosophical plausible possible Prinz pro tanto psychological psychopaths question reason relevant response role second-order second-order desire seems semantics sense sentimentalism Sigrún Smith someone stance Strandberg suggests Svavarsdóttir theory thesis things thought experiment tion Tresan truth value inquiry verdict Weak Evaluative Judgement wrong-judgments Zangwill
Bibliographic information
| Title | Motivational Internalism Oxford moral theory |
| Editors | Gunnar Björnsson, Fredrik Björklund, Caj Strandberg |
| Edition | illustrated |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press, 2015 |
| ISBN | 0199367957, 9780199367955 |
| Length | 306 pages |
| Subjects | › Philosophy / Ethics & Moral Philosophy |
| Export Citation | BiBTeX EndNote RefMan |