Ethical Naturalism: Current Debates
Susana Nuccetelli, Gary Seay
Cambridge University Press, Dec 8, 2011 - Philosophy
Ethical naturalism is narrowly construed as the doctrine that there are moral properties and facts, at least some of which are natural properties and facts. Perhaps owing to its having faced, early on, intuitively forceful objections by eliminativists and non-naturalists, ethical naturalism has only recently become a central player in the debates about the status of moral properties and facts which have occupied philosophers over the last century. It has now become a driving force in those debates, one with sufficient resources to challenge not only eliminativism, especially in its various non-cognitivist forms, but also the most sophisticated versions of non-naturalism. This volume brings together twelve new essays which make it clear that, in light of recent developments in analytic philosophy and the social sciences, there are novel grounds for reassessing the doctrines at stake in these debates.
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five arguments from Parfit against normative naturalism
feel the width
chapter 4 On ethical naturalism and the philosophy of language
how both moral naturalism and moral skepticism may be permissible positions
chapter 6 Moral naturalism and categorical reasons
chapter 7 Does analytical moral naturalism rest on a mistake?
chapter 8 Supervenience and the nature of normativity
chapter 9 Can normativity be naturalized?
chapter 10 Ethical nonnaturalism and experimental philosophy
chapter 11 Externalism motivation and moral knowledge
chapter 12 Naturalism absolutism relativism
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absolutists analytical naturalism argue argument belief and desire causal characterization cognitivism cognitivist committed concepts Dancy debate empirical epistemology error theory erties ethical naturalism ethical naturalists example explain expressivism externalist Harman Humean instantiated intrinsic desires intuitions Jonathan Dancy Joyce Joyce’s judgments kind mative maximize happiness metaethical metaphysical modal logic Moore’s moral demands moral facts moral naturalism moral naturalists moral predicates moral properties moral realism moral reasons moral skepticism morally right motivation natural fact natural properties naturalistic fallacy non-analytic non-cognitivism non-cognitivist non-moral non-naturalism non-naturalists non-normative nontrivial guilt feelings normative facts normative properties objection one’s open question argument Parfit philosophers philosophy of mind plausible possible practical reason Premise priori problem properties and facts question rational realist reasons for action reductive relevant role Ross sense Smith sufficient reason supervenience suppose thesis things tion tive trivial true truth Utilitarian virtuous agent Wedgwood wrong