Taxation and State-Building in Developing Countries: Capacity and Consent

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Deborah Brautigam, Odd-Helge Fjeldstad, Mick Moore
Cambridge University Press, Jan 10, 2008 - Political Science
There is a widespread concern that, in some parts of the world, governments are unable to exercise effective authority. When governments fail, more sinister forces thrive: warlords, arms smugglers, narcotics enterprises, kidnap gangs, terrorist networks, armed militias. Why do governments fail? This book explores an old idea that has returned to prominence: that authority, effectiveness, accountability and responsiveness is closely related to the ways in which governments are financed. It matters that governments tax their citizens rather than live from oil revenues and foreign aid, and it matters how they tax them. Taxation stimulates demands for representation, and an effective revenue authority is the central pillar of state capacity. Using case studies from Africa, Asia, Eastern Europe and Latin America, this book presents and evaluates these arguments, updates theories derived from European history in the light of conditions in contemporary poorer countries, and draws conclusions for policy-makers.
 

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Contents

taxation and statebuilding
1
demands The third approach highlights the role of war and
5
decades later in the construction of systems of sanitation and
9
figure in rulers incentives to establish good extractive bureaucracies and
16
competing
34
I end up in Section 26 with two main conclusions
37
the cases vary and different scholars interpret
49
about revenue raising Indeed where citizens do not finance the
56
Table 63 Bonds issued by ten most active developing countries
152
644 The progressive export tax and the dirigiste state
153
350
166
summary of characteristics of historical periods
168
07
169
officials repeatedly contacted nitrate owners both individuals and those
174
volume of exports coefficients of variation
177
Political interactions in this period were encapsulated in stateled
181

research on the effects of high aid levels see Moss
62
3 Capacity consent and tax collection
64
politics were not significant factors in regime breakdown The defection
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however embodied an inherent tension between the economic interests
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Business Journal 22 July 2005 Meanwhile the enduring strength of
83
4
89
increases in procurements see Bernstein 1984 During the rest of
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43 Structural sources of the peasant tax burden
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Table 41 Taxes fees and apportionments imposed on Chinese peasants
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Table 42 Tax burdens as a proportion of per capita
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Table 43 Regional variations in tax burdens on the
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461 A new deal for Chinas peasants?
110
5 Mass taxation and statesociety relations
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531 Tanzania
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political competition in 1992 has added an incentive for local
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revenue budget Bahiigwa et al 2004 Thereafter until it was
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revenue performance were also observed between councils that
127
tax collection It can undermine tax effort and hence
134
export taxation
135
case while the fourth section focuses on several episodes in
139
Total revenues
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years of discussion committees and debate and some reluctance by
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Table 62 Growth in nineteenthcentury public debt in British colonies
150
a pathway
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824 Demands from the informal sector
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83 The informal sector is undertaxed
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Table 81 Environmental influences on associational taxation
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853 Peru
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Ghana Senegal and
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Table 82 cont
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informal sector associations improved but revenues have not increased
205
863 Institutional channels of interaction
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interaction left the local government unable to cater to the
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87 Conclusions
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9 Rethinking institutional capacity and tax
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Table 91 Net tax receipts of the Salt
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Table 92 Salt Inspectorate collections under the National Government
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Table 93 Comparative personnel classification and salary scales
228
themselves to the kinds of impersonal rulemaking at the core
231
in the government the political masters in the Ministry of
234
10 Tax reform and statebuilding in a
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perhaps the global reform agenda does not address some of
238
fact that a substantial number of issues those more
242
1032 Shifting towards more appropriate revenue sources
244
administrations and their larger corporate clients However although
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bread to politicians sitting in the Cabinet or the legislature
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Page 7 - Ninthly, is annexed to the Sovereignty, the right of making war and peace with other nations and commonwealths ; that is to say, of judging when it is for the public good, and how great forces are to be assembled, armed, and paid for that end, and to levy money upon the subjects to defray the expenses thereof.

About the author (2008)

Deborah Brautigam is Associate Professor at American University, Washington D.C.

Mick Moore is Professorial Fellow in the Institute of Development Studies and Director of the Centre for the Future State at the University of Sussex.

Odd-Helge Fjeldstad is Research Director at the Chr. Michelsen Institute, Norway and Director of the U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre.

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