The Imagination in Spinoza and Hume: A Comparative Study in the Light of Some Recent Contributions to Psychology

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University of Chicago Press, 1902 - Imagination - 77 pages
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Page 52 - In short, there are two principles which I cannot render consistent, nor is it in my power to renounce either of them, viz. that all our distinct perceptions are distinct existences, and that the mind never perceives any real connexion among distinct existences.
Page 67 - I shall not at present meddle, with the physical consideration of the mind, or trouble myself to examine, wherein its essence consists, or by what motions of our spirits, or alterations of our bodies, we come to have any sensation by our organs, or any ideas in our understandings ; and whether those ideas do, in their formation, any, or all of them, depend on matter or not.
Page 42 - Tis this latter principle which peoples the world, and brings us acquainted with such existences, as by their removal in time and place, lie beyond the reach of the senses and memory.
Page 49 - I have already observ'd, in examining the foundation of mathematics, that the imagination, when set into any train of thinking, is apt to continue, even when its object fails it, and like a galley put in motion by the oars, carries on its course without any new impulse.
Page 50 - The imagination tells us that our resembling perceptions have a continued and uninterrupted existence and are not annihilated by their absence. Reflection tells us that even our resembling perceptions are interrupted in their existence and different from each other.
Page 43 - According to my system, all reasonings are nothing but the effects of custom, and custom has no influence, but by enlivening the imagination, and giving us a strong conception of any object. It may therefore be concluded, that our judgment and imagination can never be contrary, and that custom cannot operate on the latter faculty after such a manner, as to render it opposite to the former. This difficulty we can remove after no other manner, than by supposing the influence of general rules.
Page 33 - ... its various relations and extrinsic tokens. If we now direct our attention to these primitive emotions, and to what has been said concerning the nature of the mind, we shall be able thus to define the emotions, in so far as they are referred to the mind only. GENERAL DEFINITION OF THE EMOTIONS. Emotion, which is called a passivity of the soul, is a confused idea...
Page 48 - ... tis impossible this presumption can arise from probability. The same principle cannot be both the cause and effect of another; . and this is, perhaps, the only proposition concerning that relation, which is either intuitively or demonstratively certain.
Page 47 - From the mere repetition of any past impression, even to infinity, there never will arise any new original idea, such as that of a necessary connexion; and the number of impressions has in this case no more effect than if we confined ourselves to one only.
Page 47 - For it implies no more than this, that like objects have always been plac'd in like relations of contiguity and succession ; and it seems evident, at least at first sight, that by this means we can never discover any new idea, and can only multiply, but not enlarge the objects of our mind.

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