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abstract accidents according action activity actual affirm agent allow appear assertion attributes beautiful body called causality cause changes character clear conceive conception condition consciousness consider constituted created definition deny determinate difficulty distinction distinguished doctrine effect elements essence essential evil existence experience explain express fact feeling finite follows further give given Hence human Hume idea identity impossible individual infinite intellect intelligence kind knowledge known laws least limit Logic material matter meaning mental mere Metaphysics mind nature necessary never notion object opposite perfection personality philosophers physical positive possible present principle produce prove qualities question reality reason reference regard relation relative result sense simply soul Space speak stands substance succession suppose taken term theory thing Thomas thought tion true truth understanding unity universe whole
Page 292 - I may venture to affirm of the rest of mankind, that they are nothing but a bundle or collection of different perceptions, which succeed each other with an inconceivable rapidity, and are in a perpetual flux and movement.
Page 343 - ... is carried by habit, upon the appearance of one event, to expect its usual attendant, and to believe that it will exist. This connexion, therefore, which we feel in the mind, this customary transition of the imagination from one object to its usual attendant, is the sentiment or impression from which we form the idea of power or necessary connexion.
Page 132 - For the creation was subjected to vanity, not of its own will, but by reason of him who subjected it, in hope that the creation itself also shall be delivered from the bondage of corruption into the liberty of the glory of the children of God.
Page 167 - Whether in sound of the swallowing sea As is the world on the banks, So is the mind of the man. Vainly does each, as he glides, Fable and dream Of the lands which the river of Time Had left ere he woke on its breast, Or shall reach when his eyes have been closed.
Page 88 - Truth is within ourselves ; it takes no rise From outward things, whate'er you may believe. There is an inmost centre in us all, Where truth abides in fulness...
Page 239 - A sensation involves only this, "but a remembrance of sensation, even if not referred to any particular date, involves the suggestion and belief that a sensation, of which it is a copy or representation, actually existed in the past ; and an expectation involves the belief, more or less positive, that a sensation, or other feeling, to •which it directly refers, will exist in the future. Nor can the phenomena involved in these two states of consciousness be adequately expressed without saying that...
Page 132 - For the earnest expectation of the creature waiteth for the manifestation of the sons of God. For the creature was made subject to vanity, not willingly, but by reason of him who hath subjected the same in hope. Because the creature itself also shall be delivered from the bondage of corruption into the glorious liberty of the children of God. For we know that the whole creation groaneth and travaileth in pain together until now.
Page 285 - ... sight of our past selves, doubts are raised whether we are the same thinking thing, ie, the same substance, or no? which, however reasonable or unreasonable, concerns not personal identity at all: the question being, what makes the same person ? and not, whether it be the same identical substance which always thinks in the same person...
Page 227 - I have said, not imagining how these simple ideas can subsist by themselves, we accustom ourselves to suppose some substratum wherein they do subsist, and from which they do result; which therefore we call substance.
Page 233 - Were ideas entirely loose and unconnected, chance alone would join them : and 'tis impossible the same simple ideas should fall regularly into complex ones (as they commonly do) without some bond of union among them, some associating quality, by which one idea naturally introduces another.