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A. E. Taylor absolute abstract activity actual appear autres bien body Bradley C'est choses cism common sense concepts concrete conjunctive relation conscience consciousness continuous d'autres d'une definite dialectic disjunctions doctrine dualisme empiricist ence essay exist experienced external F. H. Bradley fact fait feel felt function humanism humanistic ideas inner intellectual Journal of Philosophy kind knower knowledge l'expérience logical manière Meaning of Truth ment mental metaphysical mind monisme nature nerve-cells ness notion object panpsychic pensée percept perience physical physique Pluralistic Universe postulate pragmatic present Principles of Psychology Problems of Philosophy Professor Psychology and Scientific pure experience qu'elle qu'il question radical empiricism réalité reality rela reprinted retrospective riences Scientific Methods seems self-transcendency sensation Shadworth Hodgson sort stand substitute terminate theory things thought through-and-through tion tout transitions treat true understand whole words
Page 42 - To be radical, an empiricism must neither admit into its constructions any element that is not directly experienced, nor exclude from them any element that is directly experienced. For such a philosophy, the relations that connect experiences must themselves be experienced relations, and any kind of relation experienced must be accounted as 'real' as anything else in the system.
Page 170 - The individualized self, which I believe to be the only thing properly called self, is a part of the content of the world experienced. The world experienced (otherwise called the 'field of consciousness ') comes at all times with our body as its centre, centre of vision, centre of action, centre of interest. Where the body is is 'here'; when the body acts is 'now"; what the body touches is 'this'; all other things are 'there' and 'then
Page 170 - The body is the storm centre, the origin of co-ordinates, the constant place of stress in all that experience-train. Everything circles round it, and is felt from its point of view. The word 'I,' then, is primarily a noun of position, just like 'this
Page ix - The postulate is that the only things that shall be debatable among philosophers shall be things definable in terms drawn from experience.
Page x - The statement of fact is that the relations between things, conjunctive as well as disjunctive, are just as much matters of direct particular experience, neither more so nor less so, than the things themselves.
Page 4 - My thesis is that if we start with the supposition that there is only one primal stuff or material in the world, a stuff of which everything is composed, and if we call that stuff 'pure experience...
Page xiii - Let empiricism once become associated with religion, as hitherto, through some strange misunderstanding, it has been associated with irreligion, and I believe that a new era of religion as well as of philosophy will be ready to begin.
Page 103 - In short, there are two principles which I cannot render consistent, nor is it in my power to renounce either of them, viz. that all our distinct perceptions are distinct existences, and that the mind never perceives any real connexion among distinct existences.
Page 25 - Consciousness connotes a kind of external relation, and does not denote a special stuff or way of being. The peculiarity of our experiences, that they not only are, but are known, which their "conscious" quality is invoked to explain, is better explained by their relations — these relations themselves being experiences — to one another.