receipt of the goods. Atchison, T. 4 S. F. R. Co. v. Harold, 241 U. S. 371, 36 Sup. Ct. Rep. 665, 60: 1050

55. The subject of the delivery of an interstate shipment by the carrier to the consignee is so embraced by the provisions of the act of June 29, 1006 (34 Stat, at L. 584, chap. 3591, U. S. Comp. Stat. Supp. 1911, p. 1288), amendatory of the act of February 4, 1887 (24 Stat, at L. 379, chap. 104, U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 3154, § 1, as to invalidate, when applied to interstate shipments, the provisions of Ark. demurrage law of April 19, 1907, § 3, exacting a per diem penalty from a carrier failing to notify the consignee promptly of the arrival of the shipment at destination, the intent of which section, under the construction of the state court, being to subject the carrier to the penalties therein prescribed because of failure to make prompt delivery. St. Louis, I. M. 4 S. R. Co. v. Edwards, 227 U. S. 265, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 262, 57: 506

56. Congress has so taken possession of the subject of the delivery, when called for, of railroad cars to be used in interstate traffic, bv the provisions of the act of June 29, 1906' (34 Stat, at L. 584, chap. 3591, U. S. Comp. Stat. Supp. 1911, p. 1288), imposing a specific duty upon railway carriers to furnish cars for such traffic upon reasonable request, and giving remedies for violations of that duty, as to invalidate, when applied to cars demanded for interstate transportation, the provisions of Minn. Laws 1907, chap. 23, requiring railway companies to furnish freight cars on demand, under penalty for each day's delay not due to certain excepted causes. Chicago, R. I. 4 P. R. Co. v. Hardwick Farmers Elevator Co. 226 U. S. 426, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 174,

57: 284

Cited in note in 44 L.R.A.(N.S.) 643, on duty of carrier to furnish cars.

57. Rights and remedies conferred by existing state laws, where a shipment accepted by a carrier for interstate transportation has been lost, injured, or damaged, were not continued in force by the proviso in the Carmack amendment of June 29, 1906 (34 Stat, at L. 584, chap. 3591, U. S. Comp. Stat. Supp. 1911, p. 1288), to the act of February 4, 1887 (24 Stat, at L. 379, chap. 104), § 20, that nothing therein contained shall deprive the holder of the receipt or bill of lading of any remedy or right of action which he has under existing law, but such proviso only preserves to such holder any right or remedy which he may have had under existing Federal law at the time of his action. Adams Exp. Co. v. Croninger, 226 U. S. 491, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 148, 57: 314 Chicago, St. P. M. 4 O. R. Co. v. Latta, 226

U. S. 519, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 155 57: 328

58. Congress has so far taken over the subject of a carrier's liability for loss or damage to interstate shipments bv the act of June 18, 1910 (36 Stat, at L. 539, chap. 309, Comp. Stat. 1913, S 8563), and the act of June 29, 1906 (34 Stat, at L. 584, chap.

3591, Comp. Stat. 1913, § 8563), amending respectively §§ 1 and 20 of the act of February 4, 1887 (24 Stat, at L. 386, chap. 104,) as to invalidate the provisions of S. C. Civ. Code 1912, § 2573, in so far as they may subject a terminal carrier to the prescribed penalty of $50 for failure to pay promptly a claim for damages to an interstate shipment, no matter where the loss occurred, unless the carrier proves that the shipment never came into its possession, or succeeds, within the forty days allowed, in shifting the loss by giving notice as to when, where, and by which carrier the property was damaged, or by showing that it used due diligence, but was unable to discover where the damage occurred; nor is the statute saved by calling it an exercise of the police power, nor by the proviso in the act of June 29, 1906, saving the rights of holders of bills of lading under existing law. Charleston 4 W. C. R. Co. v. Varnville Furniture Co. 237 U. S. 597, 35 Sup. Ct. Rep. 715, 59: 1137

Annotated in Ann. Cas. 1916D, 333. Cited in note in L.R.A.1917B, 926, 927, 928, on constitutionality of statute imposing penalty or added liability for failure of railroad or carrier to pay claim.

59. Congress has not so far exercised its paramount authority by enacting the Carmack amendment of June 29, 1906 (34 Stat, at L. 584, 595, chap. 3591, U. S. Comp. Stat. Supp. 1911, pp. 1288, 1307), to the act of February 4, 1887 (24 Stat, at L. 379, chap. 104, U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 3154), § 20, regulating the liability of a carrier for the loss or damage to an interstate shipment, as to prevent the application to a claim against a carrier, based upon a loss of an interstate shipment, of the provisions of Texas Laws 1909, p. 93, for the allowance of a reasonable attorney's fee of not over $20 to the successful plaintiff in a suit in which an attorney is actually employed upon a claim not exceeding $200, against "any person or corporation doing business in this state, for personal services rendered, or for labor done, or for material furnished, or for overcharges on freight or express, or for any claim for lost or damaged freight, or for stock killed or injured by such person or corporation, its agents or employees," where such claim is not paid within thirty days after demand, and the recovery is for the full amount claimed. Missouri, K. 4 T. R. Co. v. Harris, 234 U. S. 412, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 790, 58: 1377

60. Congress has so far occupied, by the act of June 29, 1906 (34 Stat, at L. 584, chap. 3591, U. S. Comp. Stat. Supp. 1911, p. 1288), the field of regulation with regard to the obligations to be assumed by interstate express carriers, as to invalidate, as applied to the interstate business of an express company, the provisions of a municipal ordinance requiring every owner of a public express to give a bond "for each and every vehicle licensed" to be conditioned "for the safe and prompt delivery of all baggage, packages," etc., intrusted to the owner or driver "of any such licensed express." Barrett v. New York, 232 U. S. 14, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 203, 58: 483

Piatt v. New York, 232 U. S. 35, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 209, 58: 492

Tolls, rates, and charges.

61. Congress has so completely taken control of the subject of rate making and charging by the provisions of the act to regulate commerce and the amendments thereof as to invalidate the provisions of N. C. Code 1905, § 2631, so far as they penalize the refusal of a carrier to receive a tender of freight for transportation to a point on the line of another carrier outside the state where no rate for such shipment has been established, filed, or published. Southern R. Co. v. Reid, 222 U. S. 424, 32 Sup. Ct. Rep. 140, 56: 257 Southern R. Co. v. Reid, 222 U. S. 444, 32

Sup. Ct. Rep. 145, 56: 263

62. Congress has so completely taken control of the subject of railroad rate making and charging as to invalidate the provisions of a state statute so far as they penalize the refusal of a railway carrier to receive a tender of freight for transportation to a point on the line of another carrier outside the state, where the carrier had no rate for such shipment. Southern R. Co. v. Burlington Lumber Co. 225 U. S. 99, 32 Sup. Ct. Rep. 657, 56: 1001

63. Congress has the power to control the intrastate rates maintained by a carrier under state authority to the extent necessary to remove the resulting unjust discrimination against interstate commerce arising out of the relation between such intrastate rates and interstate rates which are reasonable in themselves. Houston, E. & W. T. R. Co. v. United States, 234 U. S. 342, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 833, 58: 1341

64. The inclusion of railroad ferries in the act of February 4, 1887 (24 Stat, at L. 379, chap. 104, U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 3154), § 1, as one of the subjects regulated by that statute, is such an extension of the Federal authority over the operation by a railway company of a ferry upon a navigable river forming the boundary between two states as to invalidate any regulation under state authority of the rates to be charged by such company for the interstate ferriage of persons, although such regulation relates only to persons other than railroad passengers. New York, C. & H. R. R. Co. v. Hudson County, 227 U. S. 248, 33 Sup. C*

269, 57: 499

Cited in note in 52 L.R.A.(N.S.) 574, on regulation of international or interstate ferries.

65. The states continued to possess the right to prescribe reasonable rates for the exclusively internal traffic on interstate carriers after the passage of the interstate commerce act of 1887 (24 Stat, at L. 379, chap. 104, U. S. Comp. Stat. Supp. 1911, p. 1284), and the amendment of June 29, 1906

(34 Stat, at L. 584, chap. 3591, TJ. S. Comp. Stat. Supp. 1911, p. 1288), although it may be that by reason of the interblending of the interstate and intrastate operations of such carriers adequate regulation of interstate rates cannot be maintained without imposing requirements with respect to their intrastate rates which substantially affect the former. Simpson v. Shepard, 230 U. S. 352, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 729, 57: 1511

66. Congress could and did invest the Interstate Commerce Commission with authority to remove an existing discrimination against interstate commerce by directing a change of an intrastate rate prescribed by state authority. American Exp. Co. v. South Dakota ex rel. Caldwell, 244 U. S. 617, 37 Sup. Ct. Rep. 656, 61: 1352

67. The requirement of S. D. Laws 1911, chap. 207, § 10, as amended by Laws 1913, chap. 304, that no advance in intrastate rates may be made except after thirty days' notice to the Board of Railroad Commissioners by the filing of schedules, and to the public by publication and posting in every office of the carrier in the state, may be disregarded by express companies when raising intrastate rates conformably to an order of the Interstate Commerce Commission, which directed such companies to remove an existing discrimination against interstate commerce by ceasing to charge higher rates between Sioux City, Iowa, and South Dakota points than for substantially equal distances between such South Dakota points and five named South Dakota cities. American Exp. Co. v. South Dakota ex rel. Caldwell, 244 U. S. 617, 37 Sup. Ct. Rep. 656, 61: 1352

68. An order of the Interstate Commerce Commission directing express companies to remove an existing discrimination against interstate commerce by ceasing to charge higher rates between Sioux City, Iowa, and South Dakota points than for substantially equal distances between such South Dakota points and five named South Dakota cities is not so indefinite as not to serve the express companies as a justification for failure to observe the regulations and orders imposed by state authority respecting such intrastate rates, since the necessary data for adjusting the rates in controversy is furnished by the limitation in such order to the relation of rates to and from Sioux City, and to and from the five South Dakota cities "under substantially similar circumstances and conditions and for substantially equal distances," and by the statement in the Commission's report, which is made a part of the order, that one of such express companies operates over the lines of the Chicago & Northwestern and Chicago, St. Paul. Minneapolis, & Omaha Railway Companies, and the other over the line of the Chicago, Milwaukee, & St. Paul Railway Company. American Exp. Co. v. South Dakota ex rel. Caldwell. 244 U. S. 617, 37 Sup. Ct. Rep. 656, 61: 1358

i

69. Shipments of freight under local bills of lading calling for transportation from interior points in Louisiana to New Orleans, there to be delivered to the shipper's or consignee's order, but intended by the shippers to be exported to foreign countries, and treated accordingly by both shippers and carriers, constitute foreign commerce, and as such are governed as to the intrastate transportation by the tariffs on file with the Interstate Commerce Commission, to the exclusion of the rates established by the state railroad commission. Railroad Commission v. Texas & P. R. Co. 229 U. S. 336, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 837,

57: 1215

Cited in note in L.R.A.1916E, 533, on altering destination during shipment as affecting interstate character.

70. A shipment of lumber destined by the purchaser for export, made by the seller under a local bill of lading from an interior point in Texas to a Texas Gulf port, at which the lumber was unloaded without delay by the purchaser's order into slips or docks, in reach of ship's tackle, and was then loaded into chartered ships, by which it was carried to foreign ports,—such shipment not being an isolated one, but typical of many others,—constitutes foreign commerce, and as such is governed by the tariffs on file with the Interstate Commerce Commission to the exclusion of the rates established by the state railroad commission, although the seller had no connection with the lumber after it reached the railway terminus, and had no concern with its destination after it came into the hands of the purchaser, and no knowledge thereof, and although the lumber had no definite foreign destination at the time of the initial shipment. Texas & N. O. R. Co. v. Sabine Tram Co. 227 U. S. Ill, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 229, 57: 442

71. A state statute authorizing a railway company incorporated under the laws of the state to issue transportation in payment for printing and advertising must give way, so far as interstate transportation is concerned, before the provisions of the act to regulate commerce of February 4, 1887 (24 Stat, at L. 379, chap. 104, U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 3154), and the acts amendatory thereof, under which a carrier can accept nothing but money in exchange for interstate transportation. Chicago, I. & L. R. Co. v. United States, 219 U. S. 486, 31 Sup. Ct. Rep. 272, 55: 305

Railway operation; Interchange of traffic.

72. The subject of electric headlights for locomotives has not been so far covered by the various acts of Congress relating to safety appliances and to the functions of the Interstate Commerce Commission respecting such appliances and the prevention of accidents, t. e.. act of March 2, 1893 (27 Stat, at L. 531, chap. 196, U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 3174), act of March 2, 1903 (32 Stat, at L. 943, chap. 976, U. S.

Comp. Stat. Supp. 1911, p. 1314), act of Mav 27, 1908 (35 Stat, at L. 324, chap. 200, U. S. Comp. Stat. Supp. 1911, p. 1325), act of May 30, 1908 (35 Stat, at L. 476, chap. 225, U. S. Comp. Stat. Supp. 1911, p. 1320), act of April 14, 1910 (36 Stat, at L. 298, chap. 160, U. S. Comp. Stat. Supp. 1911, p. 1327), act of May 6, 1910 (36 Stat, at L. 330, chap. 208, U. S. Comp. Stat. Supp. 1911, p. 1329), act of February 17, 1911 (36 Stat, at L. 913, chap. 103, U. S. Comp. Stat. Supp. 1911, p. 1333), or by any regulation established by the Commission, acting under the authority of Congress, as to invalidate, as applied to railway locomotives equipped with cil headlights, and regularly used in hauling interstate freight trains over the carrier's main line, the provisions of Georgia Pub. Laws 1908, pp. 50, 51, requiring railway locomotives running on the main line to be equipped with electric headlights which shall consume not less than 300 watts at the arc, with reflectors not less than 23 inches in diameter. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Georgia, 234 U. S. 280, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 829, 58: 1312

73. Congress has not so taken over the whole subject of terminals, team tracks, switching tracks, sidings, etc., of interstate railways, as to invalidate all state regulations relative to the interchange of traffic. Grand Trunk R. Co. v. Michigan R. Commission, 231 U. S. 457, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 152, 58: 310

Cited in note in L.R.A.1916D, 456, on what constitutes switching service.

74. Congress has so far undertaken to regulate the subject as to invalidate, as an unlawful regulation of interstate commerce, an order of a state railroad commission under which a carrier may be required, upon demand of a carrier or shipper, and on terms fixed by the commission, to switch empty cars from any connection with a competing interstate railway to a designated side track within its own terminals in a city, for the purpose of being loaded there with goods intended for interstate commerce, and when so loaded, to move the same back to the competitor's line for continued transportation to another state, and also to accept from competing interstate lines at points within the city loaded cars brought from other states, and place them on its own side track, although such side track was the real destination contemplated at the time of the original shipment. Illinois C. R. Co. v. De Fuentes, 236 U. S. 157, 35 Sup. Ct. Rep. 275, 59: 517

75. Requiring an interstate railway company to furnish cars to shippers within a reasonable time after demand, as is done

i by Hurd's Rev. Stat. (111.) 1913, chap. 114, § 84, does not so directly burden interstate commerce as to render the statute invalid, irrespective of congressional legislation covering the subject, where the state courts hold that the question what is a reasonable time in any case depends upon all existing circumstances and conditions, including the requirements of interstate commerce. Illinois C. R. Co. v. Mulberry Hill Coal Co. 238 U. S. 275, 35 Sup. Ct. Rep. 760, 59: 1306

Editorial note.

State regulation requiring carriers to furnish cars to shipper as interfering with interstate commerce. 42 L.R.A.(N.S.) 984.

Regulating relation of master and servant.

Conflict of laws as to burden of proof in suit under Federal employers' liability act, see Conflict of Laws, 6.

Applicability of Employers' Liability
Act to ocean-going ships, see Mas-
ter and Servant, 17.

Partial invalidity of state statute, see
Statutes, 78.

76. The intention of Congress to take control of the subject so as to invalidate existing state statutory regulations cannot be inferred from the enactment of the employers' liability act of June 11, 1906 (34 Stat, at L. 232, chap. 3073, U. S. Comp. Stat. Supp. 1911, p. 1316), since that statute, having been held to be an invalid exercise of the power of Congress, was not a law for any purpose. Chicago, I. & L. R. Co. v. Hackett, 228 U. S. 559, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 581, 57: 966

Cited in note in 52 L.R.A.(N.S.) 268, on state regulations of relations between interstate railroads and their employees.

77. Since Congress, by the act of April 22, 1908 (35 Stat, at L. 65, chap. 149, U. S. Comp. Stat. Supp. 1911, p. 1322), took possession of the field of the employer's liability in interstate transportation by rail, all state laws upon the subject are superseded. Seaboard Air Line R. Co. v. Horton, 233 U. S. 492, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 635, 58: 1062

78. The liability of an interstate railway carrier for personal injuries resulting in the death of a servant while employed in interstate commerce is measured by the Federal employers' liability act of April 22, 1908 (35 Stat, at L. 65, chap. 149, U. S. Comp. Stat. Supp. 1911, p. 1322), which supersedes all applicable state laws. St. Louis, I. M. & S. R. Co. v. Hesterly, 228 U. S. 702, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 703, 57: 1031

Cited in note in 47 L.R.A.(N.S.) 45, on
Federal employers' liability act.

79. The laws of the several states, in so far as they cover the same field, were superseded by the enactment by Congress of the employers' liability act of April 22, 1908 (35 Stat, at L. 65, chap. 149, U. S. Comp Stat. Supp. 1909, p. 1171), regulating the liability of interstate railway carriers for the death or injury of their employees while engaged in interstate commerce. Mondou v. New York, N. H. & H. R. Co. (Second Employers' Liability Cases), 223 U. S. 1, 32 Sup. Ct. Rep. 169, 56: 327

80. The Federal employers' liability act of June 11, 1906 (34 Stat, at L. 232, chap. 3073, U S. Comp. Stat. Supp. 1907, p. 891), by undertaking to regulate commerce in the District of Columbia and the territories of the United States necessarily superseded any otherwise applicable provisions of the New Mexico act of March 11, 1903, governing suits for death and personal injuries. El Paso & N. E. R. Co. v. Gutierrez, 215 U. S. 87, 30 Sup. Ct. Rep. 21, 64: 10S

Cited in note in 47 L.R.A.(N.S-) 41, on Federal employers' liability act.

81. The employers' liabilitv act of April 22, 1908 (35 Stat, at L. 6*5, chap. 149, Comp. Stat. 1913, § 8657), governs an action by an injured employee against an interstate railway carrier to the exclusion of any applicable state statutes, although the pleadings contained no reference to the Federal act, where the evidence on the trial shows that the train on which the plaintiff was riding at the time of the injury was engaged in interstate commerce. Toledo, St. L. & W. R. Co. v. Slavin, 236 U. S. 454, 35 Sup. Ct. Rep. 306, 69: 671

Cited in note in L.R.A.1915C, 76, on Federal employers' liability act.

82. The common-law right of the father of a minor employee of an interstate railway company, injured through the latter'a negligence while he was employed in interstate commerce, to sue the company on account of expenses incurred for medical attention to his son and for the loss of the latter's services, did not survive the enactment of the Federal Employers' Liability Act of April 22, 1908 (35 Stat, at L. 65, chap. 149, Comp. Stat. 1916, § 8657), in which Congress declared when, how far, and to whom, such carriers shall be liable on account of accidents to employees in the specified class. New York C. & H. R. R. Co. v. Tonsellito, 244 U. S. 360, 37 Sup. Ct. Rep. 620, 61: 1409

83. The limitation of the responsibility of a railway carrier under the employers' liabilitv act of April 22, 1908 (35 Stat, at L. 65, chap. 149, U. S. Comp. Stat. Supp. 1911, p. 1322), § 1, for injuries to its employees resulting from defects or insufficiency in places of work or appliances to those caused by such defects and insufficiences as are "due to its negligence," governs an action brought under that statute regardless of the measure of responsibility prescribed by the local statutes. Seaboard Air Line R. Co. v. Horton, 233 U. S. 492, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 635, 58: 1062

84. Congress intended the Emplovers' Liabilitv Act of April 22, 1908 (35 Stat, at L. 6*5, chap. 149, Comp. Stat. 1916, § 8657), regulating the liability of an interstate railway carrier in case of the injury or death of an employee when employed in interstate commerce, to be as comprehensive of those instances in which it excludes liability, i. e., where there is no causal negligence for which the carrier is responsible, as of those in which liability is imposed, and in both classes such act is paramount to, and exclusive of, state regulation. Erie R. Co. v. Winfield, 244 U. S. 170, 37 Sup. Ct. Rep. 556, 61: 1057

85. The entire subject of the liability of interstate railway carriers for the death or injury of their employees while employed by them in interstate commerce is so completely covered by the provisions of the Federal Employers' Liability Act of April 22, 1908 (35 Stat, at L. 65, chap. 149, Comp. Stat. 1916, § 8657), as to prevent any award under the New York Workmen's Compensation Act (X. Y. Laws 1913, chap. 816; Laws 1914, chaps. 41, 316), where an employee was injured or killed without fault on the railway company's part while he was engaged in interstate commerce, although the Federal act gives the right of recovery only when the injury results in whole or in part from negligence attributable to the carrier. New York C. R. Co. v. Winfield, 244 U. S. 147, 37 Sup. Ct. Rep. 546, 61: 1045

86. The operation of the Federal Employers' Liability Act of April 22, 1908 (35 Stat, at L. 65, chap. 149, Comp. Stat. 1916, § 8657), governing the liability of interstate railway carriers for the death or injury of their employees while employed in interstate commerce, cannot be interfered with by a state either by putting the carriers and their employees to an election between the provisions of that statute and a state Workmen's Compensation Act, as is attempted by N. J. Laws 1911, chap. 95, or by imputing such an election to them by a statutory presumption. Erie R. Co. v. Winfield, 244 U. S. 170, 37 Sup. Ct. Rep. 556, 61: 1057

87. The common-law rule with respect to the employee's assumption of risk of injury from a defective appliance governs an action brought under the employers' liability act of April 22, 1908 (35 Stat, at L. 65, chap. 149, U. S. Comp. Stat. Supp. 1911, p. 1322), where such appliance is not covered by any Federal statute enacted for the safety of employees, to the exclusion of anv state statutes which, like N. C. Revisal 1905, § 2(146, abolished the assumption of risk as a bar to an action by a railway employee for an injury attributable to defective appliances furnished by the employer, since otherwise the subjectmatter would be controlled by the laws of the several states, and not by the Federal statute, which, in § 4, abolishes the defense of the assumption of risk only when the violation by the carrier of a Federal statute enacted for the safety of employees contributed to the death or injury of an employee. Seaboard Air Line R. Co. v. Horton, 233 U. S. 492, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 635,

58: 1062

88. The distribution of the damages recoverable, under the act of April 22, 1908,

from an interstate railway carrier, for the death of an employee while engaged in interstate commerce, is governed by the provisions of that statute, which necessarily supersede any applicable state legislation. Mondou v. New York, N. H. & H. R. Co. (Second Employers' Liability Cases), 223 U. S. 1, 32 Sup. Ct. Rep 169, 56: 327

89. Nothing in the state statute for the distribution of personal property can defeat the right of the childless widow of an interstate railway employee who was fatally injured while employed by the carrier in interstate commerce, to the entire net proceeds of a judgment for the resulting damages recovered by her as administratrix in an action against the carrier, whether her action was based upon the provisions of § 1 of the employers' liability act of April 22, 1908 (35 Stat, at L. 65, chap. 149, U. S. Comp. Stat. Supp. 1911, p. 1322), making every such carrier liable in damages for the negligent death of such employee "to his or her personal representative for the benefit of the surviving widow or husband and children of such employee; and if none, then of such employee's parents; and if none, then of the next of kin dependent upon such employee," or upon the provision of § 9, added by the act of April 5, 1910 (36 Stat, at L. 291, chap. 143, U. S. Comp. Stat. Supp. 1911, p. 1324), that "any right of action given by this act to a person suffering injury shall survive to his or her personal representative, for the benefit of the surviving widow or husband and children of such employee, and, if none, then to such employee's parents; and, if none, then of the next of kin dependent upon such employee, but in such cases there shall be only one recovery for the same injury," since such provisions govern the distribution of the damages to the exclusion of any applicable state legislation. Taylor v. Taylor, 232 U. S. 363, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 350. 58: 638

Cited in notes in 48 L.R.A.fN.S.) 988; L.R.A.1915C, 52, on Federal employers' liability act.

90. A declaration stating a good cause of action under the Federal employers' liability act of April 22, 1908 (35 Stat, at L. 65, chap. 149, U. S. Comp. Stat. Supp. 1911, p. 1322), may be treated as affording a basis for a recovery under the state law after first eliminating the allegation that the injury occurred in interstate commerce, which tho proof demonstrated was unwarranted, since by so doing the court is merely giving effect to a rule of local practice, the application of which was not in anywise in contravention of the Federal statute. Wabash R. Co. v. Hayes, 234 U. S. 86, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 729, 58: 1226

Cited in note in L.R.A.1915C, 47, on Federal employers' liability act.

91. State statutes which, like 2 Ida. Rev. Code, §§ 6926, 6909, render a wilful violation or omission of duty on the part of a railway employee whereby human life or safety is endangered punishable as a mis

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