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Interstate Commerce—Continued.

A dining car engaged in interstate commerce does not cease so to be when waiting for the train to make up and does not cease to he subject to Automatic Coupler Law.

Johnson v. So. Pac. Co., 196-1. Property, although destined eventually to be shipped without the State, is not always the subject of interstate commerce and may be taxed by the State.

Diamond Match Co. v. Ontonagon, 188-82. Sheep driven across one State to another is property engaged in interstate commerce and not subject to local taxation.

Kelley v. Rhoads, 188-1. Corporation carrying on business in one State, obtaining orders through an agent in another State, is engaged in interstate commerce, notwithstanding goods are shipped in sections and put together by agent prior to delivery; and license tax on agent invalid under commerce clause of constitution.

Caldwell v. North Carolina, 187-622. And see Norfolk & Western Ry. v. Sims, 191-441. Transportation of goods on through bill of lading between points within the same State, but by a railroad more than half of which is outside of State, is interstate commerce.

Hanley v. Kansas City Southern Railway Co., 187-617. The fact that goods produced will naturally be sold outside of State does not prevent the State of manufacture from regulating the corporation manufacturing.

Diamond Glue Co. v. United States Glue Co., 187-611.

in. FEDERAL CONTROL; See Congress; States; United States.

Franchises of corporations chartered by a State are, so far as they involve interstate commerce, subordinate to power of Congress to regulate such commerce. Hale v. ILenkel, 201-43.

McAlister v. Benkel, 201-90.

Power of Congress to protect freedom of interstate commerce extends to any means not prohibited by the constitution and the Sherman Anti-Trust Act of July 2, 1890, was a valid exercise of that power.

Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 193-197.

Power of Congress over interstate commerce is as full and free as that of States over domestic commerce, subject only to restrictions imposed by the constitution. Id. Interstate Commerce—Continued.

Extent of power of Congress over interstate commerce and railroad carriers, and to prevent merger of stock of competitive roads by transfer to holding company, and to prevent conspiracies, contracts and unlawful combinations in restraint of trade involving interstate commerce. Id.

The fact that a demand exists for fraudulently adulterated food, the sale whereof is prohibited by a State statute, does not bring the right to deal in such food within the protection of the commerce clause of the federal constitution.

Crossman v. Lurman, 192-189.

Power of Congress to regulate interstate commerce is exclusive over subjects national in character and which admit of only one uniform plan of regulation.

Atlantic & Pacific Tel. Co. v. Philadelphia, 190-160.

Congress may regulate and so prohibit transportation from one State to another by independent carriers of lottery tickets and policy slips. Lottery Case, 188-321.

Francis v. United States, 188-375.

Transportation of live stock from State to State is branch of interstate commerce, and consequently regulations in regard thereto by Congress paramount throughout United States; but State may make regulations if Congress has not covered the subject. Reid v. Colorado, 187-137.


A suit brought by railway company against the members of a state railway commission to restrain interference with its property and interstate business, under a state statute alleged to be repugnant to the commerce clause of the federal constitution, is not a suit against the State within the meaning of the eleventh amendment.

McNeill v. Southern Railway, 202-543.

States cannot, by creating corporations or in any other way, prevent Congress exercising its power over interstate commerce. Every corporation created by a State is subject to the supreme law of the land and cannot, in violation of a statute of Congress, restrain or enter into illegal combinations to attempt to restrain interstate commerce in violation of the anti-trust act.

Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 193-197. Interstate Commerce—Continued.

Although a railroad company is engaged in interstate commerce it is amenable to state regulation and taxation as to any service wholly performed within a State and not as a part of its interstate business. So held as to cab service in terminal city.

Pennsylvania R. R. Co. v. Knight, 192-21.

Congress may sanction contracts by common carriers to limit liability for their own negligence on interstate commerce shipments, but until such legislation a State may require them, although in the execution of interstate business, to be liable for the whole loss resulting from such negligence.

Pennsylvania R. R. Co. v. Hughes, 191-477.

Until Congress acts in respect of limitation of liability of carriers as to interstate commerce shipments, highest courts of each State may administer the common law as to its own interpretation. Id.

2. Taxation.

Unless they have acquired a situs for taxation elsewhere vessels engaged in interstate commerce are taxable at domicile of owner without regard to place of enrollment.

Ayer & Lord Tie Co. v. Kentucky, 202-409.

The construction by the highest court of a State that a license tax imposed on meat packing houses was exacted from a foreign corporation doing both interstate and domestic business only by virtue of the latter, is not open to review in this court. Armour Packing Co. v. Lacy, 200—226.

A license fee exacted by a State for selling liquor on a vessel engaged in interstate commerce on the Mississippi river, while in its jurisdiction, is not an interference with interstate commerce. Foppiano v. Speed, 199-501.

Since Wilson Act there is a distinction between the right to sell intoxicating liquors on vessels engaged in interstate commerce and other business conducted on such vessels—and a State may exact a license for sale of liquor on such vessels while on waters within its jurisdiction. Id.

Vessels, though engaged in interstate commerce, employed in such commerce wholly within the limits of a State are subject to taxation in that State, although registered and enrolled at a port outside of its limits.

Old Dominion S. S. Co. v. Virginia, 198-299.

The rule that tangible personal property is subject to taxation by the State wherein situated, regardless of domicile of owner, Interstate Commerce—Continued.

applies to property employed in interstate commerce on either land or water. Id.

A privilege tax can be imposed on agents of a particular business for their intrastate business, even though they carry on an interstate business." Kehrer v. Stewart, 197-60.

Tax upon seller of goods is tax on the goods, and tax on goods sold in one State and consigned to purchaser of another is illegal interference with interstate commerce, and a privilege tax cannot be imposed on agents distributing the article so shipped. Id.

A State can tax property permanently within its jurisdiction used in interstate commerce and owned by persons domiciled elsewhere, but it cannot tax the privilege of carrying on such commerce. Fargo v. Hart, 193-490.

An ordinance imposing license fees far in excess of cost of inspection cannot be sustained as to interstate commerce companies when it was clearly adopted for revenue and not for inspection purposes.

Postal Tel-Cable Co. v. Taylor, 192-64. But see Western Union Tel. Co. v. New Hope, 187-419. Where reasonableness of license fees on company doing interstate business, as fixed by municipal ordinance involved, the jury can determine only whether reasonable or unreasonable, and cannot fix a different amount as a reasonable one.

Postal Tel. Co. v. New Hope, 192-55. States cannot tax interstate commerce by imposing a license on the seller of goods imported from foreign countries Or other States in original packages, or before they have become commingled with general property in the State.

Norfolk & Western R. R. Co. v. Sims, 191-441. No State can compel anyone to pay for the privilege of engaging in interstate commerce; but this does not prevent it from imposing ordinary taxes imposed on property employed in interstate commerce and having a situs within the State. This includes the franchise of the corporation if not derived from the United States.

Atlantic & Pacific Tel. Co. v. Philadelphia, 190-160. State may tax property within its jurisdiction of corporation engaged in interstate commerce, including franchise, although not granted by the taxing State, and value such property at a fair proportionate part of the entire system operated in that and other States; and so held as to telegraph company deriving privileges under Post Road Act of 1866.

Western Union Tel. Co. v. Gottlieb, 190-412. Interstate Commerce—Continued.

Whether State taxation of franchise for ferry on boundary river unconstitutional as burden on interstate commerce involved, but not decided.

Louisville, etc., Ferry Co. v. Kentucky, 188-385. And see St. Clair County v. Interstate Transfer Co., 192-454.

3. Regulations.

A regulation of the North Carolina Railway Commission requiring freight from another State to be delivered on a private siding beyond its own right of way is a burden on interstate commerce and void under the commerce clause of the constitution. McNeill v. Southern Railway, 202-543.

While a State may, under its police power, make reasonable regulations as to time, manner and place of delivery of merchandise moving in channels of interstate commerce, any regulation directly burdening the commerce is repugnant to the commerce clause of the constitution. Id.

An absolute requirement that a railroad engaged in interstate commerce shall furnish a specified number of cars on a specified day, regardless of all other considerations except strikes and public calamities, transcends the police power of the States and is void when applied to interstate commerce, and so held as to Texas statute.

Houston & Tex. Cent. R. R. v. Mayes, 201-321.

The rule that inspection laws not providing adequate inspection and imposing a burden beyond the act are repugnant to the commerce clause of the constitution does not apply to shipments of liquor after ceasing to be articles of interstate commerce under the Wilson Act.

Pabst Brewing Co. v. Crenshaw, 198-17.

A State statute operating on liquors shipped from other States after arrival, and while held for sale and consumption, is not under the Wilson Act an interference with interstate commerce. Id.

Anti-Cigarette Law of Iowa not unconstitutional, and cannot be evaded by loosely shipping cigarettes in small boxes unbaled and in a manner not customary as to shipments of other States. Original package cases not applicable to protect such shipments under commerce clause of the constitution against police regulations of State.

Cook v. Marshall County, 196-261.

State statute of Georgia imposing on initial or connecting carrier duty of tracing lost freight and furnishing information,

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