Intergovernmental Relations and Economic Management in China
This book examines how China's decentralization process has affected and will affect the country's macroeconomic performance and the functioning of the market. With an innovative application of game theory, the author develops an analytical framework that can explain the behaviour of the central and local governments under alternative institutional environments. The study also suggests how to establish desirable rules of games in China's political and economic institutions through appropriate reforms.
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Central Government Transfer Under a Soft Budget Constraint
Intergovernmental Relations and Monetary Management
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additional administrative agricultural allocation allowed approved assume bases billion Bureau cent central bank central government central government's central-local chapter China Chinese choose commitment regime compared contract cost Council credit ceiling decentralized defined determined discussed economic effect enterprises equalization equation equilibrium ex post example excessive expenditure finance firms fiscal function funds given government revenue groups growth higher important incentive income increase industrial inflation institutional interest intergovernmental investment issued laws less loans lobbying effort local governments localities lower maximize Ministry monetary money supply objective optimal period problem production provinces Qinghai ratio reaction reduce reform regions regulations relations responsibilities restrict result retained revenue collection revenue-sharing revision sectors share soft budget constraint solve specialized stage structure Table tax rates trade transfers utility yields