Theories of Coalition FormationFirst published in 1984. In this book, the authors set forth the central ideas and results of the major theories of coalition forming behavior. These theories address situations of partial conflict of interest with the following aspects: (1) there are three or more players, (2) players may openly communicate with each other, and (3) players form coalitions by freely negotiating agreements on how to disburse the gains that result from the coalition members' joint coordinated efforts. These models arise from the two disciplines of mathematics, in the theory of cooperative n-person games with side payments, and social psychology, in theories of small group behavior in mixed-motive situations. The goal is to explore the various solution concepts that make up this body of theory, and in particular to examine the psychological premises that underlie the various theoretical models. |
Contents
PROLEGOMENA | 1 |
THE LANGUAGE OF COOPERATIVE nPERSON GAMES | 19 |
THE CORE AND | 56 |
Copyright | |
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2-person coalitions 3-person games A,BC AB,C AC,B apex coalition apex games assumptions Aumann bargaining set base coalition Base players behavior C-SOF Caplow characteristic function games Chertkoff coalition BC coalition formation coalition structure consider constant-sum control theory core counterobjection defined deviation scores dominant equal split example experimental games form coalitions game theory Gamson grand coalition group rationality GRPCs Kahan kernel Komorita market games Maschler mathematical minimum resource theory minimum winning coalitions Murnighan negotiation groups Neumann nonempty nucleolus outcomes Pachisi paradigm partition payoff allocation payoff vector Peleg pivotal power played power function predictions prefer proposed protocoalition psychological quota games Rapoport set theory Shapley value Shubik simple games situation social psychology solution concepts stable set superadditive Table theoretical theories of coalition tion transfer scheme triad triangle inequality v(AB v(AC v(AD v(BC veto games veto player Vinacke weighted majority game weighted majority representation zero normalized games