 | Norman Malcolm - Literary Collections - 1995 - 238 pages
...individual thing which he designates by the words T and 'myself. In his remark that his personal identity 'implies the continued existence of that indivisible thing which I call myself (emphasis added), there is a strong hint that T and 'myself' are used by him as names of an entity... | |
 | John Sutton - Philosophy - 1998 - 404 pages
...digestion' (BLVII: 223). 14 'A person is something indivisible, and is what Leibnitz calls a monad ... I am not thought, I am not action, I am not feeling;...I am something that thinks, and acts, and suffers' (Reid, Essays 1n: 4 ('Of Identity'), 345a). Reid asks: 'Is it not strange that the sameness or identity... | |
 | R.D. Gallie - Philosophy - 1998 - 224 pages
...his estate and be liable for a portion of his debts, which is manifestly absurd. My personal identity implies the continued existence of that indivisible thing which I call myself. Reid sometimes calls that indivisible thing a monad, as we have just seen. (Intellectual Powers 1II,IV... | |
 | Matthew J. B. Campbell, Jacqueline M. Labbe, Sally Shuttleworth - Autobiographical memory in literature - 2000 - 266 pages
...philosophy. Thomas Reid argues in his Essays on the Intellectual Pou'ers of Man (1785) that personal identity 'implies the continued existence of that indivisible...thinks, and deliberates, and resolves, and acts, and surfers. I am not thought, 1 am not action, I am not feeling; I am something that thinks, and acts,... | |
 | Christian Hoffmann - Autobiographical fiction - 2000 - 194 pages
...Kriterium von John Locke eingeführt, und er schließt damit natürlich an eine cartesische Tradition an: My personal identity, therefore, implies the continued...indivisible thing which I call myself. Whatever this seif may be, it is something which thinks, and deliberates, and resolves, and acts, and suffers. I... | |
 | Philip Hodgkiss - Philosophy - 2001 - 280 pages
...cogently, that 'my personal identity . . . implies the continued existence of that indivisible thing that I call myself. Whatever this self may be, it is something...I am something that thinks, and acts, and suffers' (Reid, quoted in Parfit, 1987, p. 223). Personal identity is thus construed as an all or nothing, deep... | |
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My personal identity, therefore, implies the continued existence of that indivisible thing which I call myself. Whatever this self may be, it is something which thinks, and deliberates, and resolves, and acts, and suffers. 
