 | Periodicals - 1886 - 406 pages
...can weaken it without first producing some degree of insanity. . . . My personal identity, tlurefore, implies the continued existence of that indivisible...and suffers. I am not thought, I am not action, I am * The reader interested in this topic is referred to an article on " Automatic Writing," in part viii.... | |
 | Salem Wilder - Evolution (Biology) - 1886 - 368 pages
...personal identity, therefore, is the continued existence -of that indivisible thing which I call myself. I am not thought, I am not action, I am not feeling ; but I think and ant and feel. Thoughts, actions, feelings change every moment ; but self, to which... | |
 | John Rickaby - First philosophy - 1890 - 424 pages
....of his personality. If he has a leg or an arm cut off, he is still the same person as before. . . . My personal identity, therefore, implies the continued...suffers. I am not thought, I am not action, I am not feeHng ; I am something that thinks, and acts, and suffers. My thoughts and actions and feelings change... | |
 | Simon Somerville Laurie - Education - 1892 - 298 pages
...scientific " phenomenal truth of more certitude than the existence of the sun as an objective reality: " I am not thought, I am not action, I am not feeling ; I am something ' that thinks and acts and feels.' The self or I is permanent, and has the same relation to all the succeeding thoughts, acts,... | |
 | Borden Parker Bowne - Philosophy - 1897 - 416 pages
...without distortion, no fact can well be more scientific than the one thus described by Thomas Eeid : "I am not thought, I am not action, I am not feeling; I am something 'that thinks and acts and feels.' The self or I is permanent, and has the same relation to all the succeeding thoughts, acts,... | |
 | John Richardson Illingworth - Immanence of God - 1898 - 282 pages
...IDENTITY ' A PERSON,' says Reid, ' is something indi•£*• visible, and is what Leibnitz calls a monad. My personal identity, therefore, implies the continued...feeling; I am something that thinks, and acts, and surfers. My thoughts, and actions, and feelings, change every moment — they have no continued, but... | |
 | Paul Janet, Gabriel Séailles - Philosophy - 1902 - 402 pages
...In order to determine the nature of the soul he reasons from phenomena to an underlying substance. " My personal identity therefore implies the continued...existence of that indivisible thing which I call myself." Royer-Collard accepted the doctrines of Reid. Maine de Biran insists strongly on the difference between... | |
 | Lonna Dennis Arnett - Soul - 1904 - 136 pages
...reason, or desire, but to that being which thinks, which reasons, which desires. " " My personal identity implies the continued existence of that indivisible thing which I call myself. To what purpose is it for philosophy to decide against common sense. The belief in a material world... | |
 | Henry Frank - Immortality - 1911 - 670 pages
...Powers of Man," says : "My personal identity implies the continued existence of that indivisible thing I call myself. Whatever this self may be, it is something which thinks, and deliberates and resolves and suffers — I am not thought, I am not action, I am not feeling; I am something that thinks and acts... | |
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My personal identity, therefore, implies the continued existence of that indivisible thing which I call myself. Whatever this self may be, it is something which thinks, and deliberates, and resolves, and acts, and suffers. 
