Free Will: A Very Short Introduction
Oxford Paperbacks, Jun 24, 2004 - Philosophy - 132 pages
Every day we seem to make and act upon all kinds of free choices - some of them trivial, and some so consequential that they may change the course of our life, or even the course of history. But are these choices really free? Or are we compelled to act the way we do by factors beyond our control? Is the feeling that we could have made different decisions just an illusion? And if our choices are not free, why should we be held morally responsible for our actions? This Very Short Introduction, written by a leading authority on the subject, looks at a range of issues surrounding this fundamental philosophical question, exploring it from the ideas of the Greek and medieval philosophers through to the thoughts of present-day thinkers. It provides a interesting and incisive introduction to this perennially fascinating subject. ABOUT THE SERIES: The Very Short Introductions series from Oxford University Press contains hundreds of titles in almost every subject area. These pocket-sized books are the perfect way to get ahead in a new subject quickly. Our expert authors combine facts, analysis, perspective, new ideas, and enthusiasm to make interesting and challenging topics highly readable.
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A. C. Grayling act otherwise action control actions we perform actually animal action basis beliefs capacity for rationality causal influence causal power causal predetermination causally determined Compatibilism crossing the road David Hume decide to go decide to raise decision-making deliberate action depends desire or want determined in advance exercise of freedom exercise problem experience explain free action free agent free will problem freedom and reason freedom of action genuine action go to Spain God’s happen Hobbes Hobbes’s theory Hobbesian human action human freedom incompatibilist freedom intentional action involves kind of causal lack libertarian freedom Malise Ruthven medieval moral responsibility occur ordinary ourselves particular decision passive philosophers possess possible practical reason-based prior causes prior desires raise my hand raise your hand randomness problem sceptic self-determination shark simply supposed take a decision theory of action things Thomas Hobbes Thomas Pink uncaused understanding voluntarily voluntary actions will-based theory