Addiction and Weakness of Will
The way in which society views addiction underlies how it treats, understands, blames, or even punishes those with addictive behaviours. This thought-provoking new book presents an original philosophical analysis bringing together addiction and weakness of will. Within the book, the author develops an integrated account of these two phenomena, rooted in a classical conception of akrasia as valuing without intending and at the same time intending without valuing. This fascinating and suggestive account addresses a number of paradoxes faced by current thinking about addiction and weakness of will, in particular the significance of control and intention for responsible action. Addiction and Weakness of Will makes an original contribution to central issues in moral psychology and philosophy of action, including the relationship between responsibility and intentional agency, and the nature and scope of moral appraisal. The book is valuable for philosophers, ethicists and psychiatrists with an interest in philosophy.
What people are saying - Write a review
We haven't found any reviews in the usual places.
Other editions - View all
account of responsibility acting against one’s actions and attitudes actions and omissions actualization model addiction and weakness agent’s agential control akratic actions akratic agent alternative apparent argue Aristotle Aristotle’s attitudes as objects behavior blame Catullus Chapter choice Christabel’s conception of akrasia conception of responsibility conflicting attitudes consider course of action diminished responsibility discussion distinction earlier eudaemonia evaluative judgment exempt fact failure of intentional first-personal Guise Holton Huck’s instance intentional agency inverse akrasia kind less than successful look moral incapacity moral responsibility motivational negative moral appraisal Neoptolemus Nicomachean Ethics non-volitional conception normative notion objects of moral Odysseus opium ordinary weakness person Philoctetes positive moral appraisal powers of reflective praiseworthy quality-of-will-based account Radoilska rational agency rational relations view reactive attitudes reasons for action reflective self-control relevant respect responsible agency responsible irrationality Satanists Section sense Smith Sophocles success in action tion tive vignette violation virtue volitional conception voluntary control Wallace