Foundations of Rational Choice Under RiskPaul Anand describes and evaluates many existing criticisms of the formal theory of rationality and subjective expected utility (SEU) theory. He tests the logical and philosophical basis for basing rational choice on SEU and argues that, empirically, SEU is false, and that normatively, it imposes unnecessary constraints on rational agency. He provides his own account of rational choice which is grounded in the relationship between an agent's preference and his or her behavior. In addition, he discusses some of the radical methodological changes in economics that form the basis for theoretical developments in decision theory. |
Contents
Experimental Evidence for Rational Choice | 19 |
Theory Aims and Evaluation | 43 |
In Praise of Intransitive Preference | 55 |
Copyright | |
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accept analysis argue argument asked assumption axiomatic behavioural content beliefs Chapter choose claim cognitive completeness consequences consistent consumer theory counterfactuals decision problem decision theory decision-maker depends discussed dominance dynamic choice economic theory economists Ellsberg ence evaluation evidence expected utility expected value experiment experimental game theory independence axiom infer instance interpretation intransitive preferences irrational issues linearity logical lottery Machina maximization methodological mystery prize Neumann and Morgenstern normative appeal options outcomes pay-off Peter Fishburn Petersburg paradox philosophical possible preference relation preference reversal primitive probability of winning proposed propositions Psychology question Ramsey rational agent rational choice rational choice theory reason relative frequencies requires risk Savage Savage's seems sense situations social stochastic dominance strict preference sub-additive subjective expected utility subjective probability suggests suppose testable theorems theorists theory of rationality tion transitivity Tversky uncertainty utility function utility theory violations weight