Perils of Dominance: Imbalance of Power and the Road to War in VietnamPerils of Dominance is the first completely new interpretation of how and why the United States went to war in Vietnam. It provides an authoritative challenge to the prevailing explanation that U.S. officials adhered blindly to a Cold War doctrine that loss of Vietnam would cause a "domino effect" leading to communist domination of the area. Gareth Porter presents compelling evidence that U.S. policy decisions on Vietnam from 1954 to mid-1965 were shaped by an overwhelming imbalance of military power favoring the United States over the Soviet Union and China. He demonstrates how the slide into war in Vietnam is relevant to understanding why the United States went to war in Iraq, and why such wars are likely as long as U.S. military power is overwhelmingly dominant in the world. Challenging conventional wisdom about the origins of the war, Porter argues that the main impetus for military intervention in Vietnam came not from presidents Kennedy and Johnson but from high-ranking national security officials in their administrations who were heavily influenced by U.S. dominance over its Cold War foes. Porter argues that presidents Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson were all strongly opposed to sending combat forces to Vietnam, but that both Kennedy and Johnson were strongly pressured by their national security advisers to undertake military intervention. Porter reveals for the first time that Kennedy attempted to open a diplomatic track for peace negotiations with North Vietnam in 1962 but was frustrated by bureaucratic resistance. Significantly revising the historical account of a major turning point, Porter describes how Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara deliberately misled Johnson in the Gulf of Tonkin crisis, effectively taking the decision to bomb North Vietnam out of the president's hands. |
Contents
| xvii | |
The Communist Powers Appease the United States | 30 |
Eisenhower and Dulles Exploit US Dominance in Vietnam | 67 |
North Vietnamese Policy under the American Threat | 106 |
Kennedys Struggle with the National Security Bureaucracy | 139 |
Johnson McNamara and the Tonkin Gulf Episode | 178 |
Bureaucratic Pressures and Decisions for War | 201 |
Other editions - View all
Perils of Dominance: Imbalance of Power and the Road to War in Vietnam Gareth Porter Limited preview - 2005 |
Perils of Dominance: Imbalance of Power and the Road to War in Vietnam Gareth Porter Limited preview - 2006 |
Perils of Dominance: Imbalance of Power and the Road to War in Vietnam Gareth Porter Limited preview - 2005 |
Common terms and phrases
action administration advisers agreement American April attack August bombing Bundy's China Chinese Cold Cold War commitment Committee Communist conflict Crisis decision Defense deployment Diem diplomatic domino draft Eisenhower elections escalation February Files foreign policy French FRUS Geneva Accords Geneva Conference guerrilla Hanoi Harriman ibid Indochina JFKL July June Kennedy Kennedy's Khrushchev Laotian LBJL Le Duan leaders Logevall March McGeorge Bundy McNamara memo of conversation ment military intervention Missile Moscow NARA national security bureaucracy negotiations neutralist neutralization North November NSC meeting nuclear officials party Pathet Lao peace Pentagon Papers Pham Van Dong president pressure regime Robert Rusk Saigon Secretary South Vietnam Southeast Asia Soviet Union strategic telegram threat tion Tonkin U.S. embassy U.S. forces U.S. military U.S. policy U.S. power U.S. troops United University Press USSR Viet Minh Vietnam policy Vietnam War Vietnamese Washington William Bundy withdrawal York Zhou