Beyond "justification": Dimensions of Epistemic Evaluation

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Cornell University Press, 2005 - Philosophy - 256 pages

Much of the writing in Anglo-American epistemology in the twentieth century focused on the conditions for beliefs being "justified." In a book that seeks to shift the ground of debate within theory of knowledge, William P. Alston finds that the century-long search for a correct account of the nature and conditions of epistemic justification misses the point. Alston calls for that search to be suspended and for talk of epistemic justification to cease. He proposes instead an approach to the epistemology of belief that focuses on the evaluation of various "epistemic desiderata" that may be satisfied by beliefs.Alston finds that features of belief that are desirable for the goals of cognition include having an adequate basis, being formed in a reliable way, and coherence within bodies of belief. In Alston's view, a belief's being based on an adequate ground and its being formed in a reliable way, though often treated as competing accounts of justification, are virtually identical. Beyond "Justification" also contains discussions of fundamental questions about the epistemic status of principles and beliefs and appropriate responses to various kinds of skepticism.

 

Contents

INTRODUCTION I
1
DISPENSING WITH JUSTIFICATION II
11
THE EPISTEMIC POINT OF VIEW
29
THE EPISTEMIC DESIDERATA APPROACH
39
An Outline of the Epistemic Desiderata Approach
47
Interrelations of Desiderata
49
Internalism and Externalism
51
Internalism and Externalism on Justificationism and on the Epistemic Desiderata Approach 333
53
BeliefForming Processes
120
BeliefForming Mechanisms as Psychologically Realized Functions
125
The Problem of Generality Solved
129
Identity of Adequacy of Ground and Reliability of Process
132
Objections and Complications
138
Some More Serious Complications
143
Proper Functioning of Cognitive Faculties
148
Sosa and Goldman
152

DEONTOLOGICAL DESIDERATA
58
Basic Voluntary Control of Believing
62
Other Modes of Voluntary Control of Believing
67
Indirect Voluntary Influence on Believing
73
ADEQUACY OF GROUNDS OF BELIEF
81
Having Evidence and Basing a Belief on It
89
Adequacy of Grounds and Truth
92
Adequacy of GroundsPreliminaries
94
Adequacy of Grounds and Epistemic Probability
98
The Logical Construal of Epistemic Probability
104
A Frequency Construal of Epistemic Probability
109
RELIABILITY AND OTHER TRUTHCONDUCIVE DESIDERATA
114
Zagzebski
157
Conclusion on Intellectual Virtue
161
ADDITIONAL EPISTEMIC DESIDERATA
162
Group V Desiderata
165
WHERE PARTICULAR DESIDERATA ARE
170
The Truth Conducivity of Grounds of Perceptual Beliefs
184
CRITICAL QUESTIONS ABOUT EPISTEMOLOGICAL
191
SKEPTICISM
211
THE EPISTEMIC DESIDERATA APPROACH
230
Envoi
243
Index
251
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About the author (2005)

The late William P. Alston was Professor of Philosophy Emeritus at Syracuse University. His books include A Realist Conception of Truth, Illocutionary Acts and Sentence Meanings, The Reliability of Sense Perception, and Perceiving God: The Epistemology of Religious Experience, all from Cornell.

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