Timing the De-escalation of International ConflictsLouis Kriesberg, Stuart J. Thorson In the field of conflict analysis, the topic of preconditions for negotiations has been a relatively neglected one. This volume seeks to fill the gap by moving beyond a discussion of techniques for negotiations, to addressing the problem of getting adversaries to enter into negotiations. |
Contents
Timing Conditions Strategies and Errors | 1 |
SUSAN FRENCH and LOUIS KRIESBERG | 27 |
Critical Elements in Determining the Suitability | 58 |
Boundaries | 97 |
Power Strategies in Deescalation | 152 |
Superpower Strategies in Efforts to Terminate the War | 182 |
Further Exploration of Track Two Diplomacy | 201 |
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Common terms and phrases
action adversaries agreement American analysis Angola arms control bargaining behavior Beirut concessions conflict resolution context cooperation Cuba Cuban Missile Crisis Cyprus de-escalation efforts de-escalation initiatives decision to negotiate deployment détente developed discussion dispute domestic factors effective escalation Europe example external forces foreign policy Gorbachev groups Hopmann impact INF Treaty interaction interest international conflicts international environment intervention involved Iraq Iraqi Israel Israeli issues Kennedy Kriesberg Kuwait leaders Lebanese Lebanon mediating ment Middle East military move mutual NATO nuclear weapons official organizations Palestinian parties peace phase players political position possible practitioners President proposal Reagan reciprocity relationship Reykjavík summit ripeness role Sadat's SALT II secretary Security Council settlement side Soviet Union stalemate strategy success superpowers Syrian tension Test Ban Thant threats tions tive Track Two diplomacy U.S. and Soviet U.S. government unilateral United Nations Univ Vietnam Warsaw Pact Washington withdrawal Zartman