The Political Economy of James Buchanan
A political economist whose numerous and influential writings explore the no-man's-land that separates the social science disciplines. The founder of the constitutional economics paradigm, Buchanan was awarded the 1986 Nobel Prize in economic science for his contributions to a theory of constitutional political economy as well as his leadership of the public choice movement.
In this volume, David Reisman seeks to explain and analyze the important insights of this difficult but stimulating multidisciplinary figure. Buchanan's recommendation of constitutional precommitment will appeal to all economists who share his conviction that politicians and bureaucrats, where not preconstrained by rules that they cannot alter at will, tend rapidly to become not servants but the masters of the electorate. His determination to define and defend the middle ground, neither anarchy nor Leviathan, will have a wider appeal still.
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