The Normative Web: An Argument for Moral RealismAntirealist views about morality claim that moral facts or truths do not exist. Does this imply that other types of normative facts, such as epistemic facts, do not exist? The Normative Web develops a positive answer to this question. Terence Cuneo argues that moral and epistemic facts are sufficiently similar so that, if moral facts do not exist, then epistemic facts do not exist. But epistemic facts do exist: to deny their existence would commit us to an extreme version of epistemological scepticism. Therefore, Cuneo concludes, moral facts do exist. And if moral facts exist, then moral realism is true. It is sometimes said that moral realists rarely offer arguments for their position, settling instead for mere defenses of a view they find intuitively plausible. By contrast, The Normative Web provides not merely a defense of robust realism in ethics, but a positive argument for this position. In so doing, it engages with a range of antirealist positions in epistemology such as error theories, expressivist views, and reductionist views of epistemic reasons. These positions, Cuneo claims, come at a prohibitively high theoretical cost. Given this cost, it follows that realism about both epistemic and moral facts is a position that we should find highly attractive. |
Contents
Introduction | 1 |
Moral Realism of a Paradigmatic Sort | 20 |
Defending the Parallel | 52 |
The Parity Premise | 89 |
Epistemic Nihilism | 115 |
Epistemic Expressivism Traditional Views | 124 |
Epistemic Expressivism Nontraditional Views | 145 |
Epistemic Reductionism | 185 |
Three Objections to the Core Argument | 224 |
248 | |
261 | |
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accept according action affairs agent alethic antirealist appears appropriate argue argument assume assumption attitudes Blackburn categorical certain chapter character claim cognitive goals committed commonsensical concepts concerning consider considerations consists correct deflationary deny descriptive developed discussion engage entities epistemic discourse epistemic facts epistemic merits epistemic reasons evidence example exist explain express expressivism expressivists facts exist fails false favor follows function Gibbard given hold implies indicate judgments justified kind least matter mean mental moderate moral and epistemic moral facts moral realism motivating nature nihilism norms objection objectionable offer ordinary paradigmatic particular person philosophers platitudes plausible position predicative premise present propositions putative question rational realist reason to believe reductionism regarding reject relation represent representation respect response satisfy seems sense sentences sort suggest Suppose term theoretical thesis things thought true truth understand understood various