Showing, Sensing, and Seeming: Distinctively Sensory Representations and Their Contents
Certain representations are bound in a special way to our sensory capacities. Many pictures show things as looking certain ways, for instance, while auditory mental images show things as sounding certain ways. What do all those distinctively sensory representations have in common, and what makes them different from representations of other kinds? Dominic Gregory argues that they are alike in having meanings of a certain special type. He employs a host of novel ideas relating to kinds of perceptual states, sensory perspectives, and sensory varieties of meaning to provide a detailed account of the special nature of the contents which belong to distinctively sensory representations. The resulting theory is then used to shed light on a wide range of intellectual issues. Some of the topics addressed in Showing, Sensing, and Seeming relate to distinctively sensory representations in general, but many of them concern distinctively sensory representations of more specific kinds. The book contains detailed philosophical examinations of sensory mental imagery and pictures, for instance, and of memory, photography, and analogous nonvisual phenomena.
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analysis of depiction analysis of distinctively apparent sensory memories appearance-content auditory mental images chapter characterize claim comes from subjective corresponds to seeming discussion distinctively sensory content distinctively sensory records distinctively sensory representations distinctively sensory showing distinctively visual contents distinctively visual picturing example existentially quantified explain fact Figure grasp ideas image shows things imagine instance involve Kosslyn lifelike pictures Man’s mental image shows mental imagery nature one’s particular past-directed perspectival philosophical pictorial picture shows things picture-portion picture’s portray Pylyshyn relation relative relevant representation shows things resulting scene-showing corresponds sensation-type sensory appearances sensory episodes sensory mental images sensory representations show sensory showing comes show how things sorts specific subjectively informative suppose tactile theory of distinctively thereby things as looking things as standing things stand sensorily Tulip-bit types of sensations View-sensation visual appearances visual episodes visual field visual mental image visual mental imagery visual sensations Wollheim