The Mirror of the World: Subjects, Consciousness, and Self-Consciousness

Front Cover
OUP Oxford, 2014 - Philosophy - 320 pages
0 Reviews
Christopher Peacocke presents a philosophical theory of subjects of consciousness, together with a theory of the nature of first person representation of such a subject of consciousness. He develops a new treatment of subjects, distinct from previous theories, under which subjects were regarded either as constructs from mental events, or fundamentally embodied, or Cartesian egos. In contrast, his theory of the first person integrates with the positive treatment of subjects—and it contributes to the explanation of various distinctive first person phenomena in the theory of thought and knowledge. These are issues on which contributions have been made by some of the greatest philosophers, and Peacocke brings his points to bear on the contributions to these issues made by Hume, Kant, Frege, Wittgenstein, and Strawson. He also relates his position to the recent literature in the philosophy of mind, and then goes on to distinguish and characterize three varieties of self-consciousness. Perspectival self-consciousness involves the subject's capacity to appreciate that she is of the same kind as things given in a third personal way, and attributes the subject to a certain kind of objective thought about herself. Reflective self-consciousness involves awareness of the subject's own mental states, reached in a distinctive way. Interpersonal self-consciousness is awareness that one features, as a subject, in some other person's mental states. These varieties, and the relations and the forms of co-operation between them, are important in explaining features of our knowledge, our social relations, and our emotional lives. The theses of The Mirror of the World are of importance not only for philosophy, but also for psychology, the arts, and anywhere else that the self and self-representation loom large. The Context and Content series is a forum for outstanding original research at the intersection of philosophy, linguistics, and cognitive science. The general editor is François Recanati (Institut Jean-Nicod, Paris).
 

What people are saying - Write a review

We haven't found any reviews in the usual places.

Contents

Acknowledgements and Sources
Introduction
Primitive SelfRepresentation
The Metaphysics of Conscious Subjects
The First Person Concept and its Nonconceptual Parent
Explaining First Person Phenomena
Descartes Defended
Paralogisms and First Person Illusions
Perspectival SelfConsciousness
Reflective SelfConsciousness
Interpersonal SelfConsciousness
Open Conclusion The Place of Metaphysics
References
Index
Copyright

Common terms and phrases

About the author (2014)


Christopher Peacocke worked in Oxford for many years, including twelve years as Waynflete Professor of Metaphysical Philosophy, before moving to New York in 2000. He taught for four years at New York University, and then moved uptown to Columbia University in 2004. He returns to England each summer to give a seminar and supervise graduates at University College London. In addition to his interests in metaphysics, epistemology, and the philosophy of mind, he continues to be concerned with issues in the philosophy and perception of music. He is Fellow of the British Academy and a Fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences.

Bibliographic information