From Individual to Collective Intentionality: New Essays
Sara Rachel Chant, Frank Hindriks, Gerhard Preyer
OUP USA, 2014 - Business & Economics - 225 pages
Many of the things we do, we do together with other people. Think of carpooling and playing tennis. In the past two or three decades it has become increasingly popular to analyze such collective actions in terms of collective intentions. This volume brings together ten new philosophical essays that address issues such as how individuals succeed in maintaining coordination throughout the performance of a collective action, whether groups can actually believe propositions or whether they merely accept them, and what kind of evidence, if any, disciplines such as cognitive science and semantics provide in support of irreducibly collective states. The theories of the Big Four of collective intentionality - Michael Bratman, Raimo Tuomela, John Searle, and Margaret Gilbert - and the Big Five of Social Ontology - which in addition to the Big Four includes Philip Pettit - play a central role in almost all of these essays. Drawing on insights from a wide range of disciplines including dynamical systems theory, economics, and psychology, the contributors develop existing theories, criticize them, or provide alternatives to them. Several essays challenge the idea that there is a straightforward dichotomy between individual and collective level rationality, and explore the interplay between these levels in order to shed new light on the alleged discontinuities between them. These contributions make abundantly clear that it is no longer an option simply to juxtapose analyses of individual and collective level phenomena and maintain that there is a discrepancy. Some go as far as arguing that on closer inspection the alleged discontinuities dissolve
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action sentences argued attitudes behavior belief and acceptance Bratman Cambridge causal-explanatory cognitive science collective acceptance collective action collective belief collective commitment collective goal collective intention collective intentionality collective scientific knowledge commitment to believe composite act consensus cooperative degree of belief deontic logic direction of fit discursive dilemma discussion entails epistemic evaluation event example explanatory future-directed intentions game theory Gilbert’s granted group action group agents group belief group cognitive group intention group members group minds group’s I-mode indispensability argument individual beliefs individual’s involves irreducibly collective is(t joint action joint commitment jointly lective Margaret Gilbert Michael Bratman Mirror Neurons motor narrow acceptance normally normative notion obligations ofjoint ofthe one’s participants phenomenology Philosophy practical reasoning primitive agent principle proposition question rationality’s relation relevant requires role satisfied sense shared intention social strategy structural rationality supervenience Suppose Supreme Court tion tive truth Tuomela utility vidual we-mode goal