The Encyclopedia of Public ChoiceCharles Rowley, Friedrich Schneider The Encyclopedia provides a detailed and comprehensive account of the subject known as public choice. However, the title would not convey suf- ciently the breadth of the Encyclopedia’s contents which can be summarized better as the fruitful interchange of economics, political science and moral philosophy on the basis of an image of man as a purposive and responsible actor who pursues his own objectives as efficiently as possible. This fruitful interchange between the fields outlined above existed during the late eighteenth century during the brief period of the Scottish Enlightenment when such great scholars as David Hume, Adam Ferguson and Adam Smith contributed to all these fields, and more. However, as intell- tual specialization gradually replaced broad-based scholarship from the m- nineteenth century onwards, it became increasingly rare to find a scholar making major contributions to more than one. Once Alfred Marshall defined economics in neoclassical terms, as a n- row positive discipline, the link between economics, political science and moral philosophy was all but severed and economists redefined their role into that of ‘the humble dentist’ providing technical economic information as inputs to improve the performance of impartial, benevolent and omniscient governments in their attempts to promote the public interest. This indeed was the dominant view within an economics profession that had become besotted by the economics of John Maynard Keynes and Paul Samuelson immediately following the end of the Second World War. |
Contents
26 | |
32 | |
Are Vote and Popularity Functions Economically Correct? | 49 |
Constitutional Political Economy | 60 |
Corruption | 67 |
Dictatorship | 77 |
Environmental Politics | 91 |
An Evaluation | 105 |
Collective Action under the Articles of Confederation | 93 |
The Constitution of the European Union | 106 |
Contractarianism | 121 |
Customary | 136 |
Direct Democracy | 149 |
Economic Freedom and Political Freedom | 163 |
Economists versus the Public on Economic Policy | 180 |
The Efficiency of the Common Law Hypothesis | 195 |
Interest Group Behavior and Influence | 118 |
Departure from Free Trade | 129 |
Harbinger of | 146 |
Monetary Policy and Central Bank Behavior | 159 |
Positive | 173 |
Public Choice from the Perspective of Economics | 191 |
Public Choice Theory from the Perspective of | 214 |
Public Choice from the Perspective of Philosophy | 235 |
Public Finance | 252 |
Scholarly Legacy of Mancur Olson | 284 |
Spatial Theory | 305 |
William H Riker | 321 |
ANDERSON Lisa Reneé | 328 |
BESLEY Timothy John | 334 |
CAIN Michael J G | 340 |
CREW Michael Anthony | 346 |
DA EMPOLI Domenico | 347 |
HOLLER Manfred Joseph | 361 |
LÓPEZ Edward John | 373 |
ROMER Thomas | 386 |
SMITH Vernon L | 396 |
VACHRIS Michelle Albert | 409 |
Hillman 129 | iii |
Preface | xxi |
Academia | 3 |
Alternative Voting Methods | 9 |
The Anatomy of Political Representation | 17 |
Arrows Impossibility Theorem | 25 |
Autocracy | 32 |
Bicameralism | 39 |
Blackmail | 41 |
Campaign Contributions and Campaign Finance | 59 |
Chicago Political Economy | 74 |
Francesco Parisi 85 | 90 |
Electoral Competition in Mixed Systems of Representation | 208 |
Environmental Politics and Economic Development | 224 |
The Evolution of | 237 |
Experimental Public Choice | 243 |
Game Theory | 257 |
The Growth of Public Expenditure | 270 |
Human Evolution and Political Behavior | 284 |
The Importance of the Middle in Spatial Politics | 297 |
Interest Groups 2 | 311 |
Is Voting Rational? | 326 |
The Law and Economics Movement | 341 |
Legal Precedents and Judicial Discretion | 343 |
Leviathan Models of Government | 356 |
Logrolling 1 | 372 |
Medieval Church | 387 |
The New Deal | 394 |
Political and Cultural Nationalism | 409 |
Political Transactioncost Manipulation | 424 |
Prohibition | 437 |
Public Choice and the Chicago School of Antitrust | 444 |
Public Goods | 457 |
Rational Irrationality | 470 |
Regulatory Takings | 484 |
Rent Seeking and Political Institutions | 499 |
SelfInterest | 517 |
Sortition | 530 |
Antitrust Lessons | 533 |
The Persuasion of Price | 549 |
The Theory and Measurement of Economic Freedom | 563 |
Transitional Economies | 576 |
The OffBudget Public Sector | 587 |
The War on Drugs | 603 |
617 | |
Other editions - View all
The Encyclopedia of Public Choice, Volume 2 Charles Rowley,Friedrich Schneider No preview available - 2004 |
Common terms and phrases
action alternative American analysis approach Associate bank behavior benefits Buchanan Cambridge central Chicago collective competition constitutional contracts contributions corruption costs countries decision demand democracy developed discussion Economics economists effects efficiency elections empirical enforcement equilibrium example existence expected explain Finance firms fiscal Friedman function given groups important incentives income increase individual inflation influence Institute interest interest groups International issues Journal legislative less limited literature logrolling majority maximize Michigan monetary nature normative noted optimal Organization outcomes particular parties perspective Political Economy Political Science positive preferences Principal problem production Professor protection public choice published rational regulation representative requires result Review role rules social society structure taxation theoretical theory tion trade Tullock University Press utility voters voting welfare