Of Rule and Revenue"A marvelous read, full of interesting lore and powerful ideas. . . . Levi has pushed the historical study of resources mobilization to a new height."—Aaron Wildavsky, University of California, Berkeley "A magnificent book, one of the best blends of rational choice theory and historical analysis I've seen. . . . [Levi's] resolute focus throughout on rulers' efforts to balance extraction of revenues against the compliance of their polities organizes this vast collection of material into a tight, compelling account."—Russell Hardin, University of Chicago "Margaret Levi convincingly integrates institutional analysis and rational choice theory to provide powerful accounts of what state rulers do. This is an important book, certain to generate broad interest and debate."—Theda Skocpol, Harvard University "I think the book will have a major impact. It positions itself in the macro-level literature and looks at states and the evolution of political forms. But it does so while championing the use of micro-level tools of reasoning and models derived from rational choice."—Robert H. Bates, Duke University |
Contents
Introduction | 1 |
The Theory of Predatory Rule | 10 |
Excursus on | 41 |
Creating Compliance | 48 |
Revenue Production in Republican Rome | 71 |
France and England in the Middle Ages and | 95 |
Introduction of the Income Tax in Eighteenth | 122 |
Compliance with the Commonwealth Income | 145 |
Conclusion | 175 |
Bringing People Back into the State | 185 |
Other editions - View all
Common terms and phrases
administration agents analysis argues assessments Australian Australian Financial Review Australian Taxation Office Badian behavior benefits bureaucracy Cambridge Canberra capitalism capitalist central century chap citizens Civil List coercion collective action Commonwealth conditional cooperation constituents constraints contemporary contract contributions coordination crown depend discount rates dominant effective enforcement England evasion example extract factors federal fiscal France French monarchs gains from trade groups Hechter ideology important incentives income tax increased individuals institutions interest labor major Marxist maximize measurement and monitoring ment military negotiation neoclassical economics noncompliance norms organization Parliament parliamentary parties precommitment predatory rule prime ministers prisoner's dilemma problem promote property rights publicans quasi-voluntary compliance rational choice relative bargaining power rent seeking Republic revenue production policies Review Roman Rome rulers Senate social society structure tax avoidance tax farmers tax farming tax system taxpayers theory of predatory tion transaction costs University Press variation York