Deterrence: A Conceptual AnalysisNewly revised in the light of the renewed debate of the last five years, this second edition of Patrick Morgan's book is a comprehensive review of the logic and the practice of deterrence. Morgan highlights the difficulties involved in immediate deterrence, the use of threat to deter in a specific, immediate situation. He then explores the irrationality of the strategic options that general nuclear deterrence offers. He shows how differences in theories of how decisions are made alter views of how deterrence works -- and how an opponent will respond to threat. Finally, he considers a way of reducing our dependence on a policy that relies on the threat of nuclear weapons. Reviews of the first edition: `This |
Other editions - View all
Common terms and phrases
alternatives American analysis appear arms race attempt basis behavior Bernard Brodie bureaucratic politics calculations capabilities chapter Colin Gray commitment conception of deterrence conflict confrontation costs credibility crises Cuban Missile Crisis damage Defense deterrence situation deterrence theory deterrent threat discussion domestic politics effect example fact fear Foreign Policy Geoffrey Blainey Graham Allison groupthink Herman Kahn hostile immediate deterrence impact incremental international politics involved irrational irrationality kind leaders limited literature Morton Halperin national security nuclear deterrence nuclear war nuclear weapons officials Ole Holsti one's opponent opponent's options parity perceived personality perspective possible posture potential precisely pressures problem processes psychological pure deterrence rational decision maker relationship rence resort to force response result retaliatory risks sensible decision maker side Soviet Union Steinbruner Stephen Maxwell strategic successful deterrence suggested superiority Thomas Schelling threat of retaliation threaten tion unacceptable uncertainty Vietnam World Politics Vol York