Victory through Coalition: Britain and France during the First World War

Front Cover
Cambridge University Press, Dec 8, 2005 - History
Germany's invasion of France in August 1914 represented a threat to the great power status of both Britain and France. The countries had no history of co-operation, yet the entente they had created in 1904 proceeded by trial and error, via recriminations, to win a war of unprecedented scale and ferocity. Elizabeth Greenhalgh examines the huge problem of finding a suitable command relationship in the field and in the two capitals. She details the civil-military relations on each side, the political and military relations between the two powers, the maritime and industrial collaboration that were indispensable to an industrialised war effort and the Allied prosecution of war on the western front. Although it was not until 1918 that many of the war-winning expedients were adopted, Dr Greenhalgh shows that victory was ultimately achieved because of, rather than in spite of, coalition.
 

Contents

1 Coalition warfare and the FrancoBritish alliance
1
2 Command 19141915
12
3 The Battle of the Somme 1916
42
4 Liaison 19141916
75
5 The Allied response to the German submarine
102
6 Command 1917
133
7 The creation of the Supreme War Council
163
8 The German offensives of 1918 and the crisis in command
186
9 The Allies counterattack
228
10 Politics and bureaucracy of supply
265
11 Coalition as a defective mechanism?
281
Bibliographical essay
286
Index
297
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About the author (2005)

Elizabeth Greenhalgh is Executive Officer at the University of New South Wales at the Australian Defence Force Academy, Canberra, and the Joint Editor of War and Society.

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